Actuary Thyl Ulenspiegel?

Anyone with a little mother wit knows one plus one equals exactly two, not more, not less.

Smart people, like the historic Thyl Ulenspiegel, made a profession out of counting. Every time bystanders gave Thyl the choice between a rix-dollar (a 'two and a half dollar' coin) or 2 dollars coins, he opted for the 2 dollars.

"Two is more than one", Thyl - clearly not an actuary - used to say. People felt pity for 'poor Thyl Ulenspiegel'. That someone like him could be that stupid!


Modern Counting
Today (2009) little has changed. Modern gurus made us believe that, through M&A's, synergy, cooperation, in or outsourcing, the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts. One plus one could easily equal three or even more.

However, research has shown that the majority of mergers and acquisitions fail. Hindsight shows that one plus one doesn't add up to three, but only to one point five, or in some cases even to zero. Cause? Synergy benefits and future market are extremely overestimated and cultural differences, despite continued 'slippery warnings', remain underestimated.

Shareholders and management of an acquired company cash their future notional profit surplus, that -at first - appears in the balance sheet as 'goodwill' and than subsequently, over the years, becomes visible as a loss in the P&L.

However there are other modern counters - not actuaries - that can even do better, as will be illustrated next.

Some youth memories never fade..
As a young boy I discovered an unstamped stamp in the attic of our house.

The stamp was worth 50 billion Deutsche Mark, dated 1923.

Completely overwhelmed I tumbled down the stairs to report my parents we'd become billionaires.

A few minutes later, completely disillusioned, I'd learned a new word: Hyperinflation.


Hyperinflation
The hyperinflation back in the twenties of the the last century is only a trifle of the current (hyper) credit inflation:

U.S. $ 1.000.000.000.000

A trillion dollars, the Fed 'invests' in buying up debt. By coincidence this equals the amount of money that Europe, the G20, will be pumping in the economy.

For all of 2009, the U.S. administration probably needs to borrow about $2 trillion. That money doesn't really exist, but that's no point of concern! The debt crisis is simply solved with more debt. What was not legitimate for the banks, is now legitimate for the 'bankruptcy proof government'. Frankly, my intuition really starts to falter now ...

Russian Credit Roulette
Modern Ulenspiegels, playing a variant of 'Russian Credit Roulette', have now left the roulette tables. With borrowed money, doubling their bet for five consecutive times in a row, they bet and lost on 'credit red'.

Instead of taking their loss, the government has taken their place at the table and decided to double the bet on red for the sixth time in a row, now playing for a trillion dollars.

All of this under enhanced risk management, governance and supervision of course.

To get a really confident feeling: the probability of consecutive six times black seems both rational and intuitive almost impossible, but is in any case less than the "safe" smaller 2.5% ruin probability (2.5% probability of insolvency) of a pension fund. Some people state there's light at the end of the 'financial crisis' tunnel.

Now let's hope this light is no oncoming train and roulette tables turn out to have a memory after all.

Maybe it's time actuaries get involved in government finance....

Live Piracy Map

According to IMB Piracy attacks almost doubled in 2009 first quarter.

Pirating in the Gulf of Aden, transit way for a third of the world's commerce, set a record of 120 attacks in 2008. Estimates of ransom payments vary and are estimated at around $40 million last year.

Attacks, and ransoms, in 2009 are on a pace to top those records. In his column "Insurance companies' piracy policies can be a double-edged sword", David Greising -business columnist for the Chicago Tribune - states:

• In the business world, risks create opportunities, so you shouldn't be surprised to know that the scourge of piracy on the high seas has led to a nifty innovation: pirate insurance.
• Chicago-based Aon Corp. and other companies have begun offering policies to guard against the loss of ships, cargo or crews to pirates.
• If shippers become more willing to make ransom payments because they'll have insurance to cover losses, it may only add to the economic booty that tempts Somalis into piracy in the first place.
• One of the lasting lessons of the piracy epidemic is how some of the world's most powerful naval forces have been almost powerless against speedboat-driving outlaws from one of the world's broken-down states. It will be tough to solve the piracy problem so long as anarchy and economic deprivation persist in Somalia.

Nevertheless piracy insurance business is high profitable for companies like AON. So profitable that according to Workers World there are some pirates who don’t use firearms to seize vessels on the high seas.

Some even go further than that


IMB
The ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the International Chamber Of Commerce (ICC). The IMB is a non-profit making organisation to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. IMB’s main task is to protect the integrity of international trade by seeking out fraud and malpractice.

IMB Live Piracy Map 2009
This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2009.

=

Actual Attack

=

Attempted Attack

=

Suspicious vessel

Sources: International Maritime Bureau,
Live Piracy Report, Piracy Map 2008, Piracy Map 2007

Any comment on where to find more information about the actuarial modeling of pirate risks (Kidnap and ransom insurance) and/or insurance quoting would be welcome.

Chinese Actuary - Computer - Crisis

One of the interesting aspects of the Chinese language is that words are like little pictures, pictograms or logographs, the so called 'characters'. Moreover, some words are a combination, or (better) a superposition, of several of those characters.

So the meaning of a Chinese word can be deducted by interpretation of the pictograms and relating them. And, as the saying is "A picture is worth a thousand words", you don't need to be an actuary to calculate the enormous expression-power of the Chinese language. Every word is like a book of words and expresses not only the rational meaning but also the embodied feeling (mood) that goes along with the the formal meaning.

The power of the Chinese language can be illustrated by three simple examples, the Chinese words for Actuary, Computer and Crisis:

1. Actuary
The Chinese word for Actuary is :精算师

Pronunciation: jing suan shyr

The Chinese word Actuary consists of three characters:

1. Jing, 精, means Skilled or Elite
2. Suàn, 算, means 'to calculate' or 'to count'
3. Shyr, 师, a suffix meaning 'a profession of' or a skilled or 'qualified practitioner of certain professions'

So, as a consequence, a stripped and therefore 'shortcoming' translation of the Chinese word for actuary would be: 'a skilled and qualified calculator'

Sources: Masteringmandarin, Translation, Wei Liu Dictionary,
Actuary Translated: A statistician who computes insurance risks and premiums.

2. Computer
The pictogram on the right means "computer" in Chinese. Actually, it consists of two characters that literally mean "Electric Brain", which the Chinese read as "computer".

However, as you may notice, the two main characters each exist of several sub-characters that also contribute and add meaning to the word 'Computer'.

Source, and more info at: Ebrain


3. Crisis
With the current credit crisis ( 信贷危机 xìndài wēijī) in mind, let's look at the Chinese word for 'crisis'. It consists of two characters




So in Chinese crisis means something like

Crisis = Danger + Opportunity

Let's apply this to daily business life.

No matter how great the danger in a crisis is, it also means a change of circumstances that creates space for new opportunities. It's an art to spot those opportunities when you're in the middle of a crisis.

But what if you're caught in a storm crisis:

Golden Rules Crisis Risk Management
In terms of risk management: If you're caught in the storm (trouble) and can't get out, don't try to. Try to get to the eye of the storm, where it's calm.

So when you're in the middle of a (credit) crisis :

• Don't run
• Set time still (Let time do the work)
• Keep your head together
• Wait for the opportunity, no matter how hard it is or how long it takes
  

Some more tips on how to behave in crisis situations you'll find on



APPROACHING A CONFLICT SITUATION

Credit Default Swaps explained

Untangling credit default swaps from Marketplace on Vimeo.

SOURCE

DNB report on Credit Crisis

As experienced actuaries you'll probably know that 'De Nederlandsche Bank' (DNB) is the Dutch supervisor on banks, pension funds, insurers and mutual funds.

Recently DNB reported about the effects of the credit crisis.

You may find the report in the recently published:

Statistical Bulletin March 2009

Main articles in this interesting bulletin discuss the following topics:

• Capital market financing more difficult and more expensive in 2008
• Dutch banks scaled down foreign activities
• Dutch pension funds fail in realizing indexation ambitions in 2009

The bulletin also includes a description of the fully revised statistics of investment funds.

Indexation
The Dutch save massively for their pensions. To supplement their future state old age pension, nearly 6 million employees save for a pension at a pension fund. At end-2007, over 2.5 million persons received a pension benefit.

These savings have accumulated into a collective nest egg of around EUR 575 billion, i.e. nearly EUR 80,000 per Dutch household (end-2008).

For many households, pension savings are by far their largest financial asset. As a result of the credit crisis, pension funds saw their financial position deteriorate. In 2008, the pension funds’ average nominal funding ratio dropped from 144% to 95%

Chart: Funding ratio.
Broken down by interest rate effect and return on equities

According to a survey among the largest 25 pension funds, the pension sector, too, is being impacted by the credit crisis.

Following catch-up indexation last year, pension benefits will probably be indexed on average at a mere 0.2% this year. This means a loss of purchasing power for pensioners, even though the price level has fallen since the summer of 2008. Many pension entitlements accrued by employees, too, are not being indexed.

In 2009, pension contributions will rise, especially those of employers with an independent company pension fund. Employees, too, will be paying higher contributions.

Interested? More info at DNB

SOURCE

Hoax Investment Management

You and I always wanted to believe that in banking or investing business, with an overdue of compliance and regulations, we could trust on management, based on highly ethical standards.

Geraint Anderson – a successful star analyst -makes an end to that believe.

Anderson was so outraged by the greed and lust of the Square Mile that he resigned from his immoral job.

After his resign he published a book - Cityboy - about the excesses and wrongdoings within London’s financial market.

Anderson truly believes the credit crunch is a direct result of short-term gambling and the bonus culture.

Investment Technique Examples

Now, as interested actuaries, let's dive a little deeper.

To 'level up your actuarial skills' and to 'open up your eyes', just two simple examples Geraint Anderson gives of the sick making list of secret modern investment techniques:

• Pump & Dump
  Manipulation of shares is chiefly done by small teams of hedge fund operators spreading false rumours. Day in, day out, you see the shares rise slightly. Rumours go round that a certain company will be taken over. These nasty little toerags work in little groups, on mobiles, and it’s very difficult to prove who started the rumour. The shares would go up by 30%. Then they would sell.
  
  
• Trash & Cash
  The opposite of Pump & dump – Trash & Cash – also happened quite a bit. You would spread false rumours that shares were going down. At which point the hedgies would “short” the shares, namely borrow them from, say, a pension fund, sell them, watch the rumour do its work and then buy them back.

The reason why these techniques are so nasty is that they lead to financial instability, according to Anderson.

Hoax marketing
The most frightening aspect is however that no matter how strong the design of a regulation or supervisory system, it can not prohibit the negative effects of the above mentioned hoax marketing techniques.

As our investment models become more and more sophisticated, it looks like 'informal market information' is the only option to get an outperformance and 'make the difference'. At least in case of a a 'short performer'.

Solution
The solution to this problem is therefore very simple:

Set out a long term investing strategy, so you don't have to worry about (short term) volatility and never ever act on rumours or incidental high risk opportunities in the marketplace.

As actuaries - for decades - we proved that we could manage the right side of the balance sheet long term. Now let's apply that same kind of advise and strategy on the left side of the balance sheet. Success!

SOURCE

Job Application Interview

Most actuaries don't have to apply for a job....

This apparent advantage could turn out to be a disadvantage later in our career, when we suffer from an 'application experience gap'.

Anyway... Do you recognize the flabbergasted feeling that occurs when, after a 'splendid' job interview, you come home with a positive feeling and the day after you are rejected?

Although you thought you performed well in the interview, somewhere, somehow, you missed the boat.

What went wrong?

Well, apart from the general pitfalls in a job interview and the trivial explanations of a rejection, most probably things went wrong due to lack of proper communication.

Probably, when you're having an interview, you'll take notes.
Because you're focused on getting the job, you're inclined to (only) write down the positive aspects of the job and the conversation.

This will definitely give you a biased view on the outcome of the interview. You simply miss or underestimate the minor or negative remarks in the interview.

How to solve this?



This is what you can do to get a more realistic idea about the outcome of the interview.

• Listen
  First of all, make sure you listen well.
  
  
• Take Notes
  Be careful not just to write down your personally important or spectacular issues (e.g salary, benefits, car, etc), but especially note (and write down!) small remarks, advices or 'used adjectives' of the interviewer.
  
  
• Split in Negatives and Positives
  Split your note paper in left and right, and put the positive issues (the Positives) on one side and the negative issues (the Negatives) on the other side.
  
  
• Manage the Negatives
  Make sure to write down every single negative issue or negative adjective, no matter how small. Don't ignore these Negatives. By questioning, make sure you understand them right and manage them one by one. If you're not able to get those negatives from the table or to put them in quarantine, they might kill you in the end without you realizing it. So:
  
  
  Manage the Negatives instead of counting the Positives
  
  
  
• Feedback
  At the end of the conversation ask for feedback and check by asking the interviewer to summarize your Positives and Negatives. If any Negatives are left, handle them with care right there.
  
  
• Don't fake
  Don't try to reason away negatives that are clear facts. If that would imply a rejection, be happy, because you are not qualified for this job and therefor wouldn't be happy in this job as well.

Evaluating an interview is not simply balancing Positives with Negatives. Even a single Negative can screw it up.

P/N-Method
Anyway, this Positives/Negatives Method is not only applicable in case of a job interview, but can be used in every "beauty parade", contract negotiation or proposal you try to defend.

Next time, with a positive attitude, keep your 'sixth sense' on the potential Negatives and manage them!

The ideal schizophrenic actuary

According to Philip Zimbardo, human beings - that includes actuaries - develop a specific attitude towards time (Time perspective).

In The Time paradox Zimbardo explains that people turn out to be primarily past, present or future orientated. Each perspective has a detailed orientation (focus):

Based on research and his own definition of a 'healthy thinkstyle' in life , Zimbardo developed an ideal time perspective score (red dots):

If you wonder what your Time perspective score is, take the test:

Take the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory

Actuary Time Perspective Paradox
Probably we all more or less agree with the position of the red dots as definition of the ideal situation. However, as an actuary it is our job (duty) to focus exactly on the opposites of that ideal situation.

In order to achieve a sound advice, we have to look seriously at the negative past experiences. We can't afford to dwell in hedonism or to deny a fatalistic view in the present, we have to be realistic!.
And last but not least it's our professional responsibility to estimate the future in a prudent way.

The 'Actuary Time Perspective Paradox' challenge is to develop an ideal personal time perspective with regard to our personal lives and an opposite professional time perspective at the same time, as it comes down to our professional life as an actuary.

So, keep being a happy ideal schizophrenic actuary!

Credit Card Account Number

As an actuary you must be interested in numbers.

Of course you know what your credit card number means and how it is generated........


In case you're not a credit card nerd, just find out here how it works on Money, Matter, and More Musings

Source

Wiki Book of Actuarial Science?

Wikibooks is great!

Wikibooks is a Wikimedia community for creating a free library of educational textbooks that anyone can edit.

Since the start in 2003, Wikibooks has grown to include over 35000 pages (year 2009) in a multitude of textbooks created by volunteers.


Chess
A great example of Wikibooks is the Wikibook Chess.

In exactly 12 chapters a variety of aspects like, Playing, Notating, Tactics, Strategies, Openings and Endgames, are clearly explained.


Wikibook of Actuarial Science
There is also a Wikibook of Actuarial Science. Although all the required chapters of 'Actuarial Science' are already there and structured, the content has to be taken care of.

So, if you like to contribute? Work for voluntary actuaries!

Model Collective Behavior?

Take a look at the next picture:

It's clear that the little fish here, have a problem.

What's also clear, is that random actions of an individual fish are not likely going to change the situation.


In the next picture, by coordinating behavior, a way has been found to solve 'the problem' :



This solution looks very simple, the question is how to organize this kind of collective "big fish" behavior?

The problem is that often first movers will not benefit from a collective approach:

It turns out that one way to get individuals to coordinate their behavior is through morality.

Interested?
In an excellent essay called A Business Plan for Catalyzing Collective Action , The Point explanes how how these cooperative mechanisms can be created.

Actuarial Models
Collective (organizing) mechanisms are important stuff for actuaries. For example, they play an essential role with regard to all kind of solidarity aspects in pension- and insurance-contracts.

Moreover, collective rational or even emotional behavior often plays a decisive role in our society, as may be clear from the 2009 credit crisis turmoil and the escalating bonus madness.

Be aware, study "collective behavior mechanisms" and take them into account when you set up your actuarial risk model.

EU Banks : US $ 8 Trillion assets

Are European banks desperate to avoid recognizing a possible loss on their 8 Trillion Dollar US-Holding assets?


US assets, owned by European banks, increased from $2 trillion in 1999 to around $8 trillion in 2009.

In 2008 the Fed lent $600 billion to European central banks to make up for collapse of dollar funding from US money market funds.



What do, as an actuary, make up from this?

Interested? Read more about this possible time bomb at:

Market Skeptics

Moreover the Fed moves that would more than double its balance-sheet assets by September to $4.5 trillion from $1.9 trillion.

This will imply a 15-Fold Increase In US Monetary Base in September 2009.

"Trust" will be a key word in 2009!

Credit Crisis Visualized

As an actuary, your friends or family often ask you to explain the credit crisis in simple words.

Questions like: Mr. Actuary, what is a CDO?

Don't waste any more time explaining, just show them the next Vimeo.



The Crisis of Credit Visualized from Jonathan Jarvis.

Saves you hours of explaining.....

Actuary Dilbert Mashup

Do you like this Dilbert Mashup?
Create your own at Dilbert.com

Pension Recovery: Yearly Negative Indexation

Hold your breath...

Since 2008, according to Milliman, the average funding ratio of the top 100 US (largest) Pension Funds has fallen from 99,6% to 71,7%.

Dutch pension funds developments are comparable.

One way of the other, pension funds have to plan their way out of this financial crisis.

On january 29, 2009, on a NETSPAR meeting, Theo Nijman, Professor Investment Theory of the Tilburg University, gave a presentation called Optimal design of recovery plans.

Nijman's recovery model
Summarized, Nijman shows several recovery options:

1. Do nothing:
   Hope that financial markets will recover and the interest rates will rise
   
   
2. Use control instruments:
• Indexation cuts, or no indexation of entitlements
• Recovery contributions (sponsor, employee)
• Return on mismatch (gamble)
• Reduction, if no recovery plan can satisfy the criteria:
  Reduction of guarantees
  

Recovery by Maggid
Although all kind of (IRS) regulations are in place, basically there's no reason for panic....
Everything in life is based on trust. So are our (ALM and VAR) models.

This implies that the only way out, is to stick to our models and their corresponding strategies as much as possible, which means in principle: Do nothing.

However, what we do need to do, is to (re)define and maintain our indexation strategy as follows:



Yearly negative indexation
This strategy implicates that for pension funds with funding ratio's of 80% or less, we'll have to apply "yearly negative indexation".

One off reduction of entitlements is not necessary in this situation and would be 'clumsy', unless the funding ratio would be less than 60% (you have to draw the line somewhere).

In fact this 'negative indexation' is not really new, it's just that we haven't been in this kind of situation before and because we didn't think we would end up in this scenario, we didn't develop any policy. Let's do it now!
Yearly negative indexation is in fact no more than the logical natural opposite of (positive) indexation.

In good times there's positive indexation en in bad times negative indexation, it's a simple as that. Books closed.


Redefine risk strategy?
Last but not least: if we never ever want to end up in a (crisis)situation like this again, we should redefine our risk strategy and select an asset mix that fits to a lower risk/return level.

The question is, when it's the the right time to reallocate, will you actually do it?

How Defined Benefit Plans work(ed)

Pension plans suffer, from a rare disease....

UK
According to IPE more than 90% of UK Defined Benefit (DB) schemes are underfunded. The aggregate funding position of almost 7,800 schemes reported a deficit of £218.7bn at the end of February 2009.

NL
The situation in the Netherlands is hardly better.Figures from the Dutch regulator,DNB, show around half of the country’s 650+ pension schemes are under-funded. The Dutch government has extended the recovery period for pension funds from three to five years. The main question is: "Is that long enough?"

How Defined Benefit Plans work(ed)


Pension funds, especially DB schemes, have to face that their worst dreams, a complete doom scenario, is becoming true :

• First the subprime market collapsed
• Then, as trust broke down, the stock market went down as well
  
• On top of that Interest rates dropped dramatically

Titanic lessons
Just like the 'unsinkable' Titanic was protected by compartments, we had protected our pension schemes with diversification. And just like the Titanic, we actuaries, asset managers, and quants made a fundamental mistake. We underestimated the correlation between the different compartments (bonds, subprimes, stocks). One hit in the vital front compartment was enough to draw our pension dreams to the bottom of the ocean.

Optimistic view
But let's not stay pessimistic.

Do you know how long it took the market to recover after 1929? .....

ONLY 25 YEARS!

Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2009
And there are more reasons to stay positive about the equity results on the long term, as is shown in the very interesting downloadable Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2009, that analysis returns from 1900 until the end of 2008.


As this yearbook shows us in more detail, it is only a matter of statistical faith, that equity performance on the long term will recover.

So the only thing we can do is, just like a sick patient: stay cool, rest (don't move), don't panic and wait until trust and the markets recover.

God bless you....

Two reasons motivate less

In an earlier TED Show psychologist Barry Schwartz illustrated in a humorous and catching way the effects od "Too much choice".

Now, in another TED Show video called, "The real crisis? We stopped being wise", he shows us that the current financial crisis can't be solved by more rules or incentive policy.

Schwartz pleads for a new approach based on a Obama's approach to solve the current financial crisis. Already before his inauguration Obama said:

“We must ask, not just is it profitable, but is it right”

Schwartz: "In his inaugrual address, Barack Obama appealed to each of us to give our best, as we try to extragate ourselves form the current financial crisis. But what did he appeal to? He did not, happily, follow in the footsteps of his predecessor and tell us to just go shopping. Nor did he tell us , 'Trust us, trust your country. Invest. Invest. Invest.' Instead, what he told us, was, to put aside the childish things. And he appealed to virtue.



Two reasons motivate less?
Schwartz brilliantly illustrates the common wrong notion that if you have one reason for doing something and you are given a second reason for doing the same thing, it seems only logical that two reasons are better than one, and you are more likely to do it.

This is not always true. sometimes two reasons to do the same thing seem to compete with one another instead of complementing, and they make people less likely to do it.

Schwartz illustrates this in the next example:

In Switzerland, back about 15 years ago, they were trying to decide where to site nuclear waste dumps. There was a national referendum and some psychologists went around and polled citizens who were very well informed. And they said, “Would you be willing to have a nuclear waste dump in your community?” Astonishingly, 50% of the citizens said “Yes.” They knew, or thought, it was dangerous, they thought it would reduce their property values, but, it had to go somewhere, and they had responsibilities as citizens.

The psychologists asked other people a slightly different question. They said, “If we paid you six weeks salary, every year, would you have a nuclear waste dump in your community?” Two reasons: it is my responsibility and I am getting paid. Instead of 50% saying yes, 25% said yes.

What happens is that the introduction of the incentive gets us to a point that, instead of asking, “What is my responsibility?”, all we ask is “What serves my interest?”

When incentives don’t work, when CEOs ignore the long term health of their companies in pursuit of short term gains that will lead to massive bonuses, the (wrong) response is always the same: get smarter incentives.

So, in general, adding more or better incentives will not motivate us more or increase our responsibility!

Actuarial lesson
As actuaries we often try to find as many reasons as possible to convince a board of taking the right decision. Perhaps we should emphasize more on finding and communicating that one and only reason to take the right decision: a prudent, healthy and solid decision (investment) that benefits all stakeholders on the long and short term, in a balanced way.


text version of video

Actuary Humor I

A priest and an Actuary were rounded up for execution by the French Revolution.

The priest had been taken over to the Guillotine and was asked if he had any last words. He said 'If I am innocent, let the Lord God Almighty prevent this execution!'

Everybody laughed until the Guillotine failed to come down on three consecutive tries due to a malfunction. So according French law, the priest was set free.

Then the Actuary had to be executed. He climbed the guillotine and calmly laid down his head on the block. Again the very same malfunction occurred on the first two tries, at which point Actuary looked up, examined the guillotine and exclaimed: "I think I see the problem"

Actuworry: Pension Math

According to Financial News the Pension Crisis is growing in Europe.
Except for Germany, most European countries are in trouble due to the credit crisis and subprime mortgages. On average, funding ratio's are below 100%.

As a lot of pension funds are mature, raising premium levels will not offer any help on the short term. Neither a 'selling stocks strategy' does. As a consequence all pension payments are at risk.

'Primarily' we should have learned from Einstein's Pensions theory:

Nevertheless, as actuaries have to be realistic, Einsteins' Pension Formule is a day after the fair. Let's look at at an other way out of this crisis.

When nothing helps, the only way out seems lowering pension rights and payments. However, this is premature and will most likely cause unnecessary social commotion.

Consider, what would you prefer:
A. $ 10.000 pension with a 100% funding ratio?
B. $ 8.000 pension with a 125% funding ratio?

Actuworry won't help. As actuaries we have to stay cool. The only realistic way out is simply to wait for better times.

Langton's Actuarial Ant

As an actuary, you believe in the consistency of your risk models.

You might think that with 10.000 observations you've got enough stuff to present a consistent statistical model with realistic expectations, variances, etc.

You are aware that the output of your model depends on the quality of the data and the assumptions. In your advice you try to communicate all that to the board in order to support sound and responsible decisions.

In other words, you've got a consistent model and, as an actuary with a professional and consistent life-philosophy, you have everything under control. No great changes will take place?

Well, 

you're probably wrong !

Just like our models, we actuaries, are not consistent

Even if we (or the risk reality we try to model) act in a stable consistent way, we (or risk reality) keep interfering with our environment and our environment responses to us.

At first this response seems meaningless and of no value. You think you're consequent and your work and achievements in life seem relatively stable, perhaps a little bit chaotic and of no great significance. But in repeating your proven receipts, way of doing or procedures endlessly, eventually

Something will change
This change often will not appear as an evolution in your life, but as a kind of revolution, out of the blue and most often unexpected.
Suddenly, just like in the credit crisis, there's an emerging situation. The way you always did it, doesn't turn out right anymore. Your model crashed, you crashed and there was nothing you could do about it. You couldn't have foreseen it, you could not have prevented it the classical way.

That's why we always have to add some non-classical extra 'common sense' safety margin thinking in our models.

Progress?
The other side of this is also true. Fore example, when you study, you'll probably, once in a while, think: what progress am I making?

But don't worry, if you keep on your track, there'll be a day your future suddenly comes to you (out of the blue: as a kind of emergent property) instead of "the you trying to make your future" in this Game of Life.

A good demonstration of this principle is

Langton's ant Langton's ant is an virtual ant that starts out on a grid containing black and white cells, and then follows the following set of rules. If the ant is on a black square, it turns right 90° and moves forward one unit. If the ant is on a white square, it turns left 90° and moves forward one unit. When the ant leaves a square, it inverts the color. The result is a quite complicated and apparently chaotic, but relatively stable, motion. But after about 10.000 moves the ant starts to build a broad diagonal "highway".

So keep in mind "Langton's Actuarial Ant" next time you design a new risk model.

Anyhow, stay on your track as an actuary and remember, whether it's you in life or your models, someday there'll be

a collapse of chaos

Coastline Fair Value

Close your eyes and take a guess at the Australian coast length? Answer : 'Exactly' 25,760 km.

1. Right, according to Wikipedia
2. Wrong! Because the exact coast length depends on the length of your ruler!

If you would measure the Australian coastline with a 1-mm ruler, you would get a length of more than 100 .000 km!

This leads to the question:

Does a 'coastline fair value' exist?

After all, as the ruler gets diminishingly small, the coastline's length gets infinitely large.
This phenomenon is also known as the Richardson Effect (or the coastline paradox).

Coastline Formula?
In 1967 a document called "How long is the coast of Britain?" was published by the great mathematician Mandelbrot

In 1967 he revived the original formula, earlier developed by Richardson :

L(G) = F . G^(1-D)

with

L=length of the coastline as a function of G

G=Ruler length

F=positive constant factor,
D=constant (D>=1). D is a ‘‘characteristic’’ of a frontier, varying from D=1 for a straight frontier to D=1.25 for a very irregular coastline like Britain. It turns out that D = 1.13 for the Australian coast and D=1.02 for the very smooth South Africa coastline.

Fractals
The constant D also stands for 'Dimension' and in 1975 Mandelbrot develops this Dimension- idea to what is called the Fractal Dimension.

Fractals turn out to be the perfect (math) language for describing all kind of natural phenomenas like leaves, trees , etc.

Fractals are even used to describe the stock market, the credit crisis or the coastline of the law.


Coastline Formula & Valuation
What can we learn from this fractal coastline measurement with regard to valuations?

1. Stop changing the rules
   If accounting standards like IFRS , GAAP and IAS or legislation are constantly changing (e.g. amendments) and getting more and more specific, valuing a company becomes like measuring the coastline with different rulers.
   
   In this case management, supervisors, stake- and shareholders lack a sustainable view on their business. You can't justify the results and value of your company if you have to measure yourself with a dynamic ruler!
   
   
2. Stop digging
   More and more deep going risk research will eventually lead to an substantial increase or even 'infinite' Value at Risk.
   
   Therefore it's important to define portfolio-, market- and product-risk- limits and structures first, right from the companies (risk) strategy.
   
   These instruments reduce the needed depth of risk research and therefore increase the control- and efficiency-level of the company.

Try to think scale free and have fun by applying fractals in actuarial science!

Actuary Quiz

Take the actuary quiz!

1. Qualify as U.S. Actuary?
2. The likelihood of death?
3. Skills quiz for students

Have fun !

Longevity escape velocity

Aubrey de Grey, a British biomedical gerontologist, states in his book "Ending Aging," that that the fundamental knowledge to develop effective anti-aging medicine mostly already exists.

In a Ted Show presentation he states:

Why should we cure aging?

Because it kills people!

Age damage
There are seven types of aging damage :

Damage rising with age	Proposed as contributing to aging by
Cell loss, cell atrophy	Brody (1955) or earlier
Extracellular junk	Alzheimer (1907)
Extracellular crosslinks	Monnier and Cerami (1981)
Cell senescence	Hayflick (1965)
Mitochondrial mutations	Harman (1972)
Lysosomal junk	Strehler (1959) or earlier
Nuclear [epi]mutations (cancer)	Szilard (1959) and Cutler (1982)

Although, for more than 25 years, science suspiciously didn't seem to develop, all kind of medicines to repair these damages are already within reach for mice.

Age damage for human beings is strongly age related:



As the chairman of the Methuselah-Foundation, De Grey stimulates scientists to develop medicines that repair age damage for this living generation.

Experiments on mouses showed that medicines didn't only slow down the aging process, but could reverse it as well (condition: start in time!). It turns out that every time a new medicine is developed and applied, it restores - above a certain threshold of reserve capacity - the lost reserve capacity for about 50%.

This would imply that if new medicines for human beings would be developed within the next decade and the rate of developing new medicines will be fast enough to stay 'ahead of the game', all people of 50 years and younger would be able to live a thousand years or more and people just slightly older could still live for hundred years or more.

In 2006 Technology Review announced a $20,000 prize for any molecular biologist who could demonstrate that De Grey was wrong. Nobody succeeded!

If De Grey is right, actuaries don't even have to start calculating new life expectancies or other (financial) consequences. Life insurance and pension will have to be redefined.
Even stronger: We'll have to redefine our life!

Sources: Ted Show presentation, Pres. 1, Pres 2

Related links:
A model of aging as accumulated damage matches observed mortality ...

Table Converter (Free!)

Do you recognize this? Sometimes you spend hours copying a simple table from a WORD-document, Internet Page or PDF-file to your (Excel) spreadsheet.
What should take about two minutes work, ends in frustration. Finally you decide to fill your spreadsheet by hand.

These times are over. With the next simple javascript application, called

Table Converter

, you'll be able to copy most tables to your spreadsheet in minutes.

Success!

Wir haben es nicht gewusst

Let's be humble and take a look at home. The home of actuaries, accountants and last but not least 'quants'.

Gewußt oder nicht gewußt?
Actuaries and accountants have failed in foreseeing the credit crisis. Together, we have greatly underestimated the developments and put our head in the sand. We've also failed to bring the emerging crisis to a possible end through enhanced cooperation with each other or by sending out common strong signals. In short: "Wir haben es nicht gewußt!"

Without an adequate technical substantiation, we have trusted business plans promising ROEs of 15% and more. This, while we all know that the average risk-free rate is still about 10% below this level and that such high returns can certainly not be made without taking additional risk.

VaR Model
As an article in The Actuary shows, we got intimidated and overruled by the quants with their Value at Risk (VaR) models. The consequences of the advices of these magic mathematicians and their VaR models are well explained in an excellent article called 'Risk Mismanagement' in the New York Times.

In another article, Global Association of Risk Professionals Review, David Einhorn explains:

VaR ignores what happens in the tails.

It specifically cuts them off.
A 99% VaR calculation does not evaluate what happens in the last 1%.

This makes VaR relatively useless as a riskmanagement tool and potentially catastrophic when its use creates a false sense of security among senior managers and watchdogs. " Quote:

VaR is like an airbag that works all the time,
except when you have a car accident

Also, according to Bloomberg, the risk-taking VaR model is broken and everyone is coming to the realization that no formula or rating system can substitute for old-fashioned 'due diligence'.

Quantum mechanics
Because of the complexity of these new VaR-like models, experienced actuaries, accountants, managers and supervisors were all afraid to ask deeper questions or to admit that they didn't totally understood these complex models that were presented as 'simple manageable board instruments' with 'simple steering parameters'. Just like nobody is eager to admit that 'quantum mechanics' is hard to understand and therefor every amateur quantum guru can say what he wants, because nobody checks it.

Consequences
This way, indirect and by our advice and our models, CEOs and CFOs of large companies and pension funds got the (wrong) impression that 'complex financial markets' were based on 'a sound statistical model', where (annual) deficit risks of 2.5%, 0.5% or 0.1% are exactly calculable and moreover also acceptable.

Whatever, lessons learned, new opportunities for actuaries to set a new benchmark for '21 century riskmanagement'.

However..., stay careful, to catch a tiger by the tail is risky!

Unfair Value

How can you be against something that's fair, like "Fair Value"?
What could be wrong, valuating a company at market value?

IceComp Case
Let me take you along in a story about IceComp, a fictitious ordinary wholesaler in ice creams.

The daily demand for ice creams turns out to be in line with the outside temperature. In an average summer, with an average temperature of 16°C (about 60°F), IceComp sells 10 million ice creams a year. Annual turnover the past 10 years, $ 20 million with a net margin of 10%.

In order to regulate demand and to maximize profit, IceComp defines the daily ice cream selling price (P) in line with the market by the formula:

P = DAYTEMP / 8

So at 32°C an ice cream will sell at $ 4 and at 16°C it will sell at $ 2 a piece. To always deliver on time, IceComp keeps an average stock of about 2 million ice creams. Based on on the average selling price of the last 10 years, this stock is valued in the balance sheet at $ 4 million, resulting in a fair and trustworthy P&L, that reflects the actual sales level at current prices.

Two years ago, inventory (stock) valuation based on market prices ('fair value'), i.e. the price daily selling price of an ice cream, became mandatory. From that moment on, things started to go wrong.

Consistent with the daily temperature, the daily inventory value starts to oscillate heavily, with explosions and variations up to $ 6 million per month. To the 'surprise' of all stakeholders, equally strong alternating monthly gains and losses are reported. It's crystal clear, the company is no longer 'in control'.

The national supervisor interferes and demands extra securities (funds). Now the monthly P&L of IceComp starts to oscillate even more, as the investment results of the extra securities, that principally do not have anything to do with the core business of IceComp, also start to vary on basis of 'fair value' (market prices) valuation.

Ultimately, lack of confidence from share- and stakeholders drives IceComp into bankruptcy.

Conclusion
What was meant to be 'intentional Fair', turns out to be 'Unfair' in practice. Valuing balance sheets on bases of daily prices is like playing 'Russian roulette'. It can be compared to making 'climate statements', based on the daily weather forecast.

The analogy to banking, pension and insurance business may be clear. Don't base valuation methods on daily prices, but on a, per product or market defined, 'moving average market price' for a fixed chosen period (depending on product or market cycle).

The current (credit) crisis calls for development of new valuating principles by auditors and actuaries.

Maarten Dijkshoorn leaves Eureko

Maarten Dijkshoorn steps down as chairman and CEO of the Executive Board of Eureko, effective January 1.



















Source: beursduivel, silobreaker

Happy Actuarial New Year

Did you know there are more than 100 "new year's days" in a calendar year?
It just depends on where you live or what you believe.

Before 1752, Americans celebrated New Year's Day on March 25th (Lady Day according to the old Celtic religion and the Feast of the Annunciation according to the Christian religion).

Great Britain and its colonies changed their New Year's celebrations to January 1st when they changed from the old Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar in 1751.

How shall we define our actuarial new year?

Read more about it on

Celebrate New Year's Day
Every Month of the Year!