Zero Problems Risk Management

More and more we actuaries and risk managers become aware that our risk models can't just be based on numbers and statistics exclusively.

Some examples:

Systemic risk

The recent financial crisis made it clear that a 'mono risk approach' on a sole risk-object (mortgage, fund-investment) is insufficient.

Investments and loans are embedded in a worldwide sea of connected financial instruments and reinvestments. Systemic risk has to be included in our models.

Main challenge here is that systematic risk essentially depends on macroeconomic and (mostly) irrational factors. Further, systemic risk is related to the structure and dynamics of the market. More than numbers.....

Supervisory Herding Risk

In their effort to control and support financial institutions like banks, pension funds and insurance companies, country supervisors, regulators and 'accounting standards boards', defined a meticulously set of guidance rules (Basel I/II/II, Solvency I/II, Qis-I-V, IFRS, FAS, AIFMD, FTK, FIRM, etc.,etc.)

Financial institutions not only confirmed and adopted to those new rules, but - in their rush and driven by cost and time pressure - also implicitly (and often unintentionally) declared those same imposed rules and rationales as their own business 'Risk Appetite'. This way, most financial Institutions became so called: 'Supervisory Compliant'.

Instead of  expliciting their specific company-targets and successively developing their own correspondent risk appetite and risk framework, they incorporated the supervisor's risk philosophy. 

Without a sound own (board) risk vision that would undoubtedly have included some extra safety on 'company specific risk issues', financial institutions became - like a herd - all in the same way extremely vulnerable to (less defined) external risks.

Summarized:

Overregulation increases Herding Risk

Financial institutions all measure and respond to regulated risks in the same way. Supervisory Herding Risk is born.....

Too Much Focus Risk

As a consequence of pre-subscribed risk categories and ruling by law or (accounting) standards, there's the risk of 'too much focus' on specific risks while forgetting, denying or neglecting other important risks. Remember, the devil is in the (correlating) details....

Here's a useful, but not exhaustive, checklist to keep track on your risk models...

Average Premium Risk	Diversification Risk	Matching Risk
Commodity risk	Employer Continuity Risk	Operational risk
Compliance Risk	Environmental Risk	Outsourcing Risk
Compliance Risk	Equity Risk	Oversight Risk
Concentration Risk	Herding Risk	Price Inflation Risk
Counterparty Risk	Interest rate risk	Property Derivatives Risk
Coverage Ratio Risk	IT Risk	Reinsurance Risk
Credit Risk	Legal risk	Reinvestment risk
Culture Risk	Legislative Risk	Reputation risk
Currency Risk	Liability Risk	Sex Calculation risk
Default Risk	Liquidity risk	Strategic risk
Deflation risk	Longevity Risk	System Risk
Disaster Risk	Market Risk	Systemic Risk
Discount Risk	Matching Risk	Wage Cost Inflation Risk

ALM Simplifying Risk

Univariate models are killing and even multivariate models have proven to be too vulnerable and too limited in the recent crisis. It's not just about correlation and covariance matrices. What we need is an self-explaining model. A model  that predicts or generates expected values in an economic context, depending on exogenous economic variables like inflation rate, GDP-Level, etc. and that is based on the same structured historical economic data-set.

We need 'Asset Liability Modeling New Style' and not only Stress Testing or
advanced and excellent Crash Modelling as well explained by EMB.

Geopolitical Risk

With Europe and Japan as recent examples, it's clear that risks come from everywhere around the world.

The consequence of earthquakes (Japan, Australia), a possible  country default (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, ..), political instability (Libya, Ivory Coast, ..), war threat (Vietnam,Iraq, ..), financial easing (US, Europe,...), on our economic system, prices and financial institutions seems substantial and - moreover- predictable.

More than just trying to catch and capitalize these kind of risks in our risk models, we need to develop (financial) mechanisms and products that can cope as best as possible with these kind of risks.

The Riskmap 2011, Managing Risk | Maximising Opportunity, offers a good description of the actual risks that influence our lives and risk models.

A nice example is the recent (unexpected) leading role that France took in action against Libya.  'Riskmap 2011' mentions the 'Arabic Poll 2010' that clearly shows (despite the lack of sympathy for president Sarkozy) the trust and sympathy for France. France clearly outperforms the US and president Obama  unfortunately has lost the trust of the Arabic world... Take a look at the next slide summary (or the original complete pdf):  

Arab Public Opinion Poll 2010 Summary

Arab Public Opinion Poll 20... by Jos Berkemeijer

The Arabic poll shows that the prime minister of Turkey, Erdogan, has clearly gained  the confidence and trust of the  Arabic countries. With Ergodan, Turkey - at the cross road between East and West - takes a leading role in the 'World Risk Management Process'.  Ergodan's Risk Philosophy, invented  by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu,   is 'Zero Problems'.....

Perhaps that should be the philosophy of actuaries too...

Zero Problems

Conclusion

From now on 'Modeling Risk' is more than just a financial exercise.
It's building scenario's, mechanisms and products that can cope with this risky world.  Success as actuary or risk manager!

Related Links:

- Committee (behaviour) assessment tool
- Control Risks:Riskmap 2011
- Arabic Poll 2010
- Supervisory Compliant
- Maplecroft Risk Maps 
- EMB: How to Model a Crash (REVO) 

Fukushima Risk Management

With all due respect for the Japanese risk managers, engineers and the Japanese people in general: The latest 2011 M=8.9 Earthquake in Japan made clear that the current Risk Models, as well as Risk Management itself, have tragically failed.

Shortcomings
Shortcomings in headlines:

• Underestimation of the probability of a M=8.9 (M>8) event
• Risk Modeling mainly focused on 'direct' earthquake effects
• Underestimation of cumulative correlated devastating effects that occurred as a consequence of a combination of Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Nuclear Disasters and Physical Concentration (4 reactors in a row!).
  
  

Frequency?
It's true, the worldwide annual frequency of a serious earthquake with a magnitude of 8 or more (M>8) seems small....

Yet - no matter how low the probability- the consequences (loss) is unacceptable if the damage in case of an event (like an earthquake M>8) is not manageable, exceeds a country's financial recuperation power, or devastates thousands of lives...

End of Time?

Lots of worrywarts think the end of time has come, as severe earthquakes are increasing.

Simple statistics show that this is not (yet ?) the case:

The expected average Magnitude value of all earthquakes with M>=7 over the period 1950-2011 (March) is M_a=7.6 with a standard deviation of SD= 0.4. The average value of the last 10 years turns out M_a=7.4 with the same SD (0.4).

Nevertheless, when we examine the graphic more closely, there seems a light (significant?) increase in large magnitude earthquakes in recent decades.....


Back to the year 0
For what it's worth, the average magnitude for M>=7 earthquakes over a longer period from 0 to 2011 (March) , turns out in line with M_a=7.6 and a SD=0.44. Or in graphics:

History Earthquakes in GoogeMaps
Finally, take a look at the history of all earthquakes with a magnitude of 7 or higher on GoogleMaps... (take look at your country!)


Earthquakes, Magnitude> 7, years 0-2011 weergeven op een grotere kaart

Let's hope and pray for the Japanese people that that the brave engineers who are fighting the current meltdown at Fukushima will succeed and survive.....

Related links
- Spreadsheet (Excel) Earthquakes 0-2011 (March), M>=7
- Crash Course Earthquake calculation by Professor Nicholas Pinter
- Effect of Seismic Risk Measures on Japanese Housing Prices
- Earthquake Software
- Download Earthquake data from USGS
- Earthquake Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
- PPT:Japan’s Nuclear Energy Program(2003-2004)
- Design criteria Japanes Nuclear Plants  
- Prediction of ground motion
- Seismic Risk Evaluation (2004)
- Earthquake Facts 
- Earthquake FAQS 
- GeoBatch: Earthquakes (history M>=7)
- GoogleMaps: Earthquakes (history M>=7)

Groupthink

IMF evaluated its role and performance in the recent financial and economic crisis.

Cause

In a 2011 crisis report with the short title: 'IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis:IMF Surveillance in 2004–07 ', IMF concludes that the main cause of their inadequate response during the crisis was:

Groupthink

IMF’s ability to detect important vulnerabilities and risks and alert the membership, was undermined by a complex interaction of factors, many of which had been flagged before but had not been fully addressed.

The IMF’s ability to correctly identify the escalating risks was hindered by:

1. A high degree of groupthink 
2. Intellectual capture
3. A general mindset that a major financial crisis was unlikely
4. Inadequate analytical approaches
5. Weak internal governance
6. Lack of incentives to work across units and raise contrarian views
7. A review process that did not “connect the dots” or ensure follow-up
8. Some impact of 'political constraints'....

Recommendations

IMF suggests some recommendations on how to strengthen its ability to discern risks and vulnerabilities and to warn in the future. Main point is to enhance the effectiveness of surveillance: it is critical to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Board, Management, and senior staff, and to establish a clear accountability framework.

Looking forward, IMF needs to

1. 
   Create an environment that encourages candor and considers dissenting views
    
2. Modify incentives to “speak truth to power”
    
3. Better integrate macroeconomic and financial sector issues
   
   
4. Overcome the silo mentality and insular culture; Deliver a clear, consistent message on the global outlook and risks.

Recognize Groupthink
Groupthink is not just something happening to IMF or 'other organisations'. We, financial institutions, all suffer somehow or somewhat from the Groupthink Virus.

How can we recognize Groupthink?
Derived from an article by Irving Janis, the inventor of the word Groupthink, let's take a look at some explicit signs of Groupthink:

1. Winning Mood syndrome
   A common illusion of success (Folie à deux), invulnerability, over-optimism, unanimity and risk-taking as a consequence.
2. Collective rationalization
   Managers, employees discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions
3. 
   Repression or Ridicule
   Direct pressure on and ridicule of  individuals who express disagreement with or doubt about the majority view or the view of the leader
4. Fear
   Fear of disapproval for deviating from the group consensus. Fear from or doubt about expressing your opinion.
5. Manipulating
   Remaining silent in a discussion is implicitly interpreted as agreeing.Obviously 'wrong' arguments are used to achieve a certain goal or policy.
6. Disrespect
   Stereotyped views of out-groups or enemy leaders as evil, weak or stupid. Good or serious ideas of colleagues are rejected on basis of the source instead of 'judged by the facts'.
7. Moral Blindness
   Unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of the in-group. Lack of discussion about ethical or moral aspects of certain decision.
8. Miscommunication and Misinformation
   Information, bottom up or top-down is (deliberately) strongly filtered
9. Idolization
   Idolization of the leader or of certain five star employees.

Lessons Learned
If you recognize some of the above signs in your organization, it is time for action.
Discuss it, do not accept it and if you cannot change it... LEAVE!

A humorous example of Misinformation are the quotes of Iraq's minister of (Mis)Informaton, Al-Sahaf, during the 2003 Iraq war.
Enjoy, laugh and learn.....



Make sure your board presentation is not based on' sahaf-statements' but on simple provable actuarial facts....

Related links/sources:
- 8 signs of groupthink
- What is Groupthink?
- IMF Crisis Report 2011

Actuary Bill Gates

For those of you that -just like me - didn't know that Bill Gates is actually a qualified actuary....



Bill Gates.., a man with a great vision and the same size of philanthropic heart. More information about Bill on the 'Bill and Mellinda Foundation' website, were another actuarial statement is launched:

All Lives Have Equal Value

With all due respect for Obama: Bill gates for president!

Links:
- 2010 Annual Letter from Bill Gates

Supervisory Compliant, is it enough?

Risk management is tricky business... Being 'Officially Compliant', 'Just Compliant' or in other words "Supervisory Compliant", is not enough to help your CEO survive with your company in the complex market battle!

Whether you're an Actuary or Risk Manager of an Insurance company, Bank or a Pension Fund, the risk of being 'Supervisory Compliant' is simply : bankruptcy!

Becoming 'Supervisory Compliant' in complex programs like Solvency-II, Basel III or Legal Pension Fund Risk Frameworks, consumes so much time and effort, that almost no time seems to be left for contemplating or doing the essential Risk Management work properly.

Just being 'Supervisory Compliant' implies:  constantly running after the Supervisor to become  'just in time' officially compliant and not having enough time to think about the (f)actual relevant risks.

Supervisory Compliance becomes very frighting when Risk Appetite and Valuations are rashly based upon the minimum Supervisory requirements, as is (e.g.) the case in the Dutch Pension Fund legal framework. Boards stop thinking about the actual risks and feel compliant and satisfied once the Supervisory Compliance Boxes are checked.

A new look at compliance
Let's take a look from a new point of view at the complete Risk Management Compliance Field:

In basis there are three types of 'being compliant':

1. Supervisory Compliant
   When you're Supervisory Compliant, you officially comply to all legal Risk Management compliance requirements. Your Supervisor is happy...
   
   
2. Professional Compliant
   You comply to your own professional Risk Management standards. You are happy...  but what about your Supervisor? Comply or Explain....
   
   
3. Success Compliant
   Being Success Compliant implies that all Risk Management requirements that are key to have success - e.g. key to survive in the market on the long run - are met.

Let's zoom in at some specific areas in this chart:

Bias areas

It's perhaps hard to admit, but in our attempt to be complete, we define and manage a lot of (small) risks that do actually exist, but are in fact not really or limited relevant with regard to company continuity.

Distinctive Character area

The Distinctive Character area is perhaps the most interesting area. To get grip on this area urges us to 'Think outside the Circle'.

By doing so we'll be able to manage risks that  our competitors fail to do. Here we can achieve 'Distinctive Character' by managing risks more efficient or by turning risks into profits. Examples are: Derivatives that limit our investment risks. Specialized experience rating (rate making) on your portfolio on basis of characteristic and unique risk profiles.

Tricky area
The tricky area is the area that consists of Supervisory Risks you tend not to find important, but that are very important for achieving success in the market. Tricky areas could e.g. be: Deflation Risk, Longevity Risk or Take Over Risk.

Reversed Thinking area
This is perhaps the most interesting risk area.

To explore this area you'll not only have  to 'think outside of your circle', but - just like in reversed stress tests with Banks - try to think backwards, to find out what could cause a certain event or loss.

This reversed thinking process succeeds best as a group. Group members should be professionals and non-professionals from different types of business, education and background.

A successful group mix could e.g. consist of : an actuary, an accountant, a manager, a marketing manager, a compliance officer, an employee, a client, a shareholder representative and last but not least the receptionist.

Finally.....
Try to find time to manage your company to new heights and stop being just 'Supervisory Compliant'.....

Gold: Risk or Rescue?

For those of you who are still doubting...we live in a crazy world....

The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) has ordered (by court !) the glass-workers pension fund (SPVG) to decrease its 13% Gold allocation to less than 3% within two months.

DNB and Court arguments in short:

1. An investment of 13% is not in line with the Prudent Person Rule, which includes the principle that: assets must be invested in such a manner as to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole.
   
   
2. Gold is a commodity and holding 13%  is classified as 'overweight' in comparison to the 2.7% average that Dutch pension funds have invested in commodities.
   
   
3. 15% allocation in Gold is a 'concentration risk' that could lead to a coverage shortage if the gold price imploded (volatility of Gold is relatively large).

At first, it seems unbelievable that important decisions, with substantial financial impact  - even in Court - are not based on financial facts, but on 'general principles' and the way the market 'used to do it'.

A decision based on an argument that refers to 'the average pension fund,' would more or less imply that pension funds would not be allowed to base their investment strategy on their own specific situation or a changing market outlook. Pension Fund Boards appear to be  'captured' by the market and a Supervisor who obviously has a hard time to develop 'own standards'....

Secondly, DNB actually takes over the investment responsibility of the pension Board. One could wander if DNB is (sufficiently) aware of the possibility that it can be hold financially responsible for the effect of a negative outcome if it turns out in the near future that SPVG has suffered a substantial financial loss, caused by this DNB-designation.

Is Gold really a risk?....  or a rescue?

Checking the facts.... 
Let's just check if DNB's and Court's arguments are valid.....

Yearly Return
We start by comparing the yearly returns of Gold, the S&P-500 Index and '10-Y Treasury Bonds' over the period 1971-2010.

To make Bonds risk-comparable with Gold and the S&P-500 Index, the yearly average Bond interest rate is translated into a yearly Market Value performance. This is done by assuming that each year, all '10-Y Bonds' bought in a specific year are valued, and sold at the average interest rate one year later (approximation).


Here is the result:

To bring some sense and order into this chart, we calculate the 'Moving Compound Annual Growth Rate' (MCAGR).
We start in 2010 and calculate the  compound average yearly return backwards moving up (year by year) to 1971. This is the result:

Now, this looks better... and a bit surprising as well!!! On the long term Gold (μ=9.2%) and the S&P-500 (μ=10.2%) are tending to a rough 9-10% yearly return......  A little bit Surprising is that Bonds (μ=7.6%) get along very well with their big risky brothers...
Take your time to 'absorb' the impact of this chart.....

Risk
Next, we take a look at Risk. We define Risk at first as the Standard Deviation (SD). We directly cut trough to the 'Moving Risk' (Moving SD).

We might conclude here that during recent years there was an increase of risk with regard to the S&P-500 (the 'red' crisis 'Mount K2' is clearly visible). Note that also for a longer period, i.c. the last 30 years, the S&P-500 Risk is substantial higher than the Risk of Gold and much higher than the Risk of Bonds. Only looking at a period of 40 years, Gold shows 'optical' up as more risky (SD=σ=25.8%) than the two other asset categories, Bonds (SD=σ=6.9%) and S&P-500 (SD=σ=18.1%).

However this way of presenting Risk is strongly discussable. Another view of Risk that comes closer to what we naturally 'perceive' as Risk, is to define Risk as only as the Downside Standard Deviation (look up : Sortino ratio ), where all positive yearly returns are eliminated (DSD) or set to zero (DSDZ).....
Let's have a look:

Now, these charts give us a quite a different sight on Risk-reality....
It shows that -on the long term -  not Gold (DSD=Dσ=7.5%) is the riskiest asset, but the S&P-500 (DSD=Dσ=10.6%). Bonds (DSD=Dσ=0.5%), as aspected, have the least volatility and are therefore less risky.

Perhaps the Risk of Bonds is a bit underestimated (very few observations) by the DSD-method (excluding positive yearly returns). In this case the downside deviation of yearly Bond-returns, replacing positive returns by zero, which generates a standard deviation of 3.2%, gives a better indication of a more likely standard deviation on the long run.


Why Gold? 
Although these simple calculations already put the DNB conclusions in a different light, let's get to the main point that should be addressed in defending why Gold should be a substantial part of any Pension Fund portfolio:
 

 Gold Reduces VaR

In a 2010 (october) publication the World Gold Council published a document called Gold: Hedging Against Tail Risk. This interesting report concludes:

1. Gold is first and foremost a consistent portfolio diversifier
2. Gold effectively helps to manage risk in a portfolio, not only by means of increasing risk-adjusted returns, but also by reducing expected losses incurred in extreme circumstances such tail-risk events (VaR).

Following this excellent WGC report, let's test the balancing and risk-reducing  power of Gold by analyzing (classical) Risk (SD) in combining Gold with different allocations (0% up to 100%)  in an asset mix with Bonds, respectively investments in S&P-500 stocks.

This chart clearly shows that Gold has the power to reduce the S&P-500 Risk (SD) from18.1% to 13,3% with an optimal asset location mix of  approximately 60% S&P-500 and 40% Gold. 

In case of Bonds the Risk (SD) is reduced from 6.9%  to 4.8% with an optimal mix of 80% Bonds and 20% Gold.

Asset Liability Model (ALM)
In practice it is necessary to optimize, by means of an adequate ALM study, the  allocation mix of stocks, Bonds and Gold. Just as a 'quick & dirty' excercise, let's take a look at the next asset-combination scenarios, based on data over the period 1971-2010:

Just some head line observations:

• From scenario M1 it becomes clear that even a 100% Bond scenario is't free from Risk. So diversification with other assets is a must.
  
• Looking at M2-M5 we find that the optimal mix, defined as the mix that best maximizes Return (Compound Annual Growth Rate)  and Sharpe Ratio (at a Risk free rate of 3% or 4%) and minimizes Risk (Standard deviation), is something something in the order of: 70% Bonds, 15% stock and 15% Gold.
  
• Scenarios M6-M8 and M9-M11 take todays most common (but strongly discussable!) practice as a starting point. Most pension funds have allocated around 50% or 40% to Bonds and 50% or 60% in more risky asset categories (stocks, etc.). It's clear that even in this situation Risk can be reduced and Return can be optimized, if Stocks are exchanged to Gold with a maximum allocation of 20% or 30%.

Notifier

Although this 'rule of thumb exercise' on this website provides some basic insights, please keep in mind that finding the optimal mix is work for professionals (actuaries).

A serious ALM Study is always necessary and should not only take into account a broad range of diversified asset categories, but should also focus and optimize on:

• The impact of the liabilities (duration) and coverage ratio volatility
• The Timing: Mean values and Standard Deviations are great, but the expected return highly depends on the actual moment of  investment or divestment in the market.
• Future expectations. In the current market situation (2011) the risk of interest rates going up and therefore Bond market value going strongly down, isn't hypothetical. Secondly, the stock market has been pumped up by trillions of 'investments' (?) in the US economy. Once this crisis-aid definitely stops, the question is if these 'cement investments' will be strong enough to keep stocks up. Personally I fear the worst...
  Not to mention a scenario with declining stock rates in combination with increasing interest rates and inflation......
  Who said the life of an actuary was easy???

Conclusion
We may conclude that:

• Investing in Gold up to a 10% to 15% allocation, reduces the Risk of a portfolio consisting of Bonds and S&P-500 Stocks substantially. 
• Gold is less Risky than investing in S&P-500 Stocks

Therefore the 'not with facts' underpinned intervention of DNB looks - to put it euphemistically -  at least strongly discussable....

A wise and modest underpinned allocation of Gold is no Risk, it's a Rescue!

Related Links:
- Spreadsheet with Data used in this Blog
- Prudent person Rule
- IPE: Dutch regulator orders pension scheme to dump gold
- GOLD: HEDGING AGAINST TAIL RISK
- Downside Risk:Sortino ratio
- Dutch Central Bank Orders Pension Fund To Sell Its Gold
- Pension Fund Benchmarking 
- Strategic Risk Managment and Risk Monitoring for Pension Funds

Bonus: Gold, Hedging against Tail Risk Video

Pension Fund Weigh House

Investment Benchmarking of Pension Funds has been made extremely difficult.

Just ask your Pension Fund's actuary whether your Pension Fund has achieved a 'market conform investment performance'... For sure you'll get a dazzling multiform and relative answer. It's all about 'market indexes' (stock and bond indexes), risk appetites, asset mixes, derivatives, uncertainty and lots of other interesting complex stuff that underpins the fact that the final answer to this simple question is nuanced, complex and relative.

A simple question
Ahead of all this growing complexity and 'levels of detail', a first key question has to be answered by every Pension Fund:

Was it worth setting up a complex multi fund investment plan instead of simply investing in 10-Years Government (Treasury) Bonds over an arbitrary period of (at least) the last 10 years?


Even this simple question, will probably not lead to a simply answer from your fund's investment manager or actuary.

Pension Fund Weigh House Help
This is where the help of the 'Pension Fund Weigh House' comes in...

Just look up the yearly return over the last ten years in your Pension Fund's annual report. Next, do the test at 'Pension Fund Weigh House'  (PFWH) and see for yourself whether your Pension Fund has  performed better than the simple benchmark: 10-Y Bonds.

 

Did your Pension Fund perform better than Bonds? (the compound mean over the last 10 years) Congratulations!
Was it worth the risk? Well..., just look at the Risk (Standard Deviation) or - even better - the Sharpe Ratio at different levels of possible 'Risk Free Rates' to find out. The Higher the Sharpe Ratio, the more it was worth to take the risk.

Market Value

To compare Bonds 'fair' with Market Value based Pension Fund performance, the yearly Bond interest rate is translated into a yearly Market Value performance. This is done by assuming that each year, all '10-Y Bonds' bought in January of a specific year are valued, and sold at the interest rate one year later.

Do it yourself

The standard example as presented on PFWH concerns the performance of the Dutch pension fund ABP, the third largest pension fund of the world. Answer the key question 'Was it worth?' for ABP for yourself.

ABP (Pfd-R) Performance 2001-2010

 

Go to PFWH and change the numbers and 'heads' in the application to fit the numbers of your own (pension) fund or change both columns (Bonds & PFD-R) to compare two pension funds .
Compare your pension fund to either  '10-Y Euro Government Bonds', '10-Y US Treasury Bonds' or the 'S&P 500 Index'.

From now on you may answer this extremely difficult question "How did my pension fund perform?" yourself in a  5 minute weigh house test.

Have (professional) fun!

Dutch Pension Muppet Show

There's a lot of fuzz about the performance of the largest (€ 246 billion assets) Dutch Pension Funds ABP and the somewhat smaller (€ 91 billion) PFZW (former PGGM). According the Dutch television program Zembla and Bureau Bosch Asset Consultants, Dutch pension funds would have consistently underperformed.

ABP commented: "The yearly return of 7.1% on average since 1993 is much higher than returns on government bonds would have been and is in part thanks to our equity investments."

PFZW overshoots ABP wit the comment: "PFZW's calculations show a return of 8.4% on average during the past 20 years which is much higher than the 10-year Dutch government bonds of 5.3% on average during the same period."

Great statements, but who's right?

Performance Test
Let's quickly "do the proof" by comparing (benchmarking) the 'modest' yearly performance of ABP with the yearly performance of 10 year Government Euro Bond Yield Benchmark as provided by the ECB.

Both pension funds are not limited to  the Dutch market, therefore  performance is not related to Dutch Government Bonds, but to 10-Y Euro Government Bonds.

As the yearly performance of ABP in a particular year is in fact a kind of 'compound performance' of the years before, it's more realistic to relate ABP's (yearly) performance to the 10-years moving average of 10-Y Euro Bonds.  

What becomes clear from is that ABP's volatility overshadows the 10-year Bond's volatility by far. As a consequence ABP's out-performance should be significant.

Let's test this by looking at the YTD (Year To Date) performance of ABP on the long run:

The average performance of ABP 1993-2010 indeed turns out exactly 7.1% as published, but hardly outperforms the 10-year Euro Bonds Moving average of 6.8%.

0.3% '18-years out-performance' (OP-18) for such a high volatility is strongly discussable. The long term out-performance 1994-2010 (OP-17) was 0.0%. The out-performances of shorter periods (OP-[18-x]) are not stable and strongly swap from positive to negative.

Benchmarking Pension funds performance with Euro Bonds 0f 20 years or longer would be even more adequate and in line with the duration of pension fund's liabilities. Taken into account that 20 year Bonds on average score a 0.25% à 1.00% higher return than 10 year Bonds, it can be concluded that Dutch pension funds on average do not out-perform Government Bonds. Not to mention the influence of the yearly investment-costs of at least 0.2% on the returns.....

Pension Fund PFZW

Pension Fund PFZW is completely lost on their non-transparent and backwards changing performance of 8.4% over the last 20 years.

From their annual (inconsistent) accounts it can be concluded that their 2001-2010 performance came down to 4,8%. This performance is exactly the same as the performance op ABP in that period and underperforms the moving average 10-years Euro Bonds with 0.7% !!!

Conclusion

It's clear that pension funds don't convince in the outperformance of Government Bonds and that the pension industry is in desperate need for an impartial benchmark with regard to out or underperformance of Bonds.

The comments from ABP and PFZW, Boenders and Cocken are like 'shooting from the hip' and must be qualified as highly unprofessional.

Dutch pension fund members are watching an extra edition of the Muppet show. Who's gonna stop this pension media madness and bring some order in the pension room?


Related Links and Sources:

- Source: 10 year Government Euro Bond Yield Benchmark
- 'grave miscalculations' in Zembla (Boender aand Kocken
- Watch: Zembla 
- Download: Spreadsheet with calculations as presented
- IPE: Heavyweights ABP, PFZW come out swinging against Zembla
- Bloomberg: 10-year, - -  30-year performance Gv. Bonds

Solvency II: Standard or Internal Model?

Solvency II is entering the critical phase.Time is running out!

But...., as a wise proverb states:

"When The Actuaries Get Tough,

The Tough get Actuaries"

However, the market for actuarial resources is limited and Solvency II Actuaries that  combine strategic and technical knowledge with 'common sense' are like  white ravens.

In the case of Solvency II, actuaries and models are moving forward in a particular way.

Standard Model
Originally, the 'standard model' was foreseen as a simple model for small and mid-size insurers (apart from very small insurers that were excluded). Big insurers, with more developed actuarial models, larger scale and more resources, were expected to work out a more sophisticated 'internal model'.

As the Solvency II Time Pressure Cooker gets up steam, things start turning.

Small and mid-size insurers found out that the 'standard model' was highly inefficient and the wrong instrument to steer adequately on risk management and to determine adequate solvency levels in their company.

Just because of their limited size and product selection, small and mid-size insurers often already have a well tuned risk management system in place and implemented throughout the organization. The manager, actuary (being the risk manager as well) and CFO of such companies therefore have enough time to develop a formal Solvency II 'internal model' that could be easily implemented throughout their organization.

Internal Model
Quit the opposite happens in the world of big insurers.

Big insurers coordinated Solvency II at Holding level and started to challenge their business-units around 2009 to develop and implement Solvency II programs on basis of an 'internal model'.

Collecting homework at the Holding in 2010, it became clear that a lot of technical issues in the models were still unclear. Moreover, models were not integrated (= condition)  in the business and counting up several 'internal models' showed up several consolidated inconsistencies. 

The complexity of developing a consistent risk model turned out to strong. Some big insurers are now considering to fall back on the 'standard model' (or partial model) before it's too late: the shortest errors are the best.

Looking back it's not surprising that big insurers need more time to operationalize a fine tuned risk model. It took specialist Munich Re 10 years to implement an internal model.

This development is also an indication that some big insurers are strongly over-sized. In order to keep up with the speed of the market, big insurers have to be split up into a manageable and market-fit size.


Related Links:

- Surviving Solvency II (2010)
- The influence of Solvency II on an insurer’s strategic policy
- White Ravens and Black Swans (Math Fun)

Actuarial Chess?

As actuaries we often have to explain HOW variables like profits, mortality, investments or costs will develop in the future.

In doing so, it would really help and strengthen our credibility if we were able to explain also WHY these variables developed in the past as they have developed, as a result of certain circumstances (other 'explaining' variables).

On basis of these WHY-arguments and the specific expected future circumstances, we could increase the credibility and diminish the volatility of our predictions.

This HOW-WHY-Insight urges us for example to analyze "medical developments" in case of predicting longevity and to study "economic developments" with regard tot predicting future costs, inflation or investment rates.

Moreover this understanding obliges us to develop our capabilities and competence to explain certain given outcomes like "increasing longevity" and "increasing stock return volatility".

Test Your 'Outcome Explanation Competence'

This 'Outcome Explanation Competence' (OEC) is key in actuarial science. No actuary can do without!

To test your OEC level, solve the next chess problem.

Black has made the last move... Which move?

You'll find the solution of this chess problem as a part of the next 5 minute 'Thinking Out of the Box' test ( on SCRIBD)......

5 Minute 'Thinking Out of the Box' Test

Just like in 'climate change predictions', our OEC (the 'competence to explain past phenomena') is necessary for us actuaries to be confident about our theories and predictions about the future.

However, developing OEC might not be enough as the explanations of the past could turn out to be fundamentally invalid with regard to the future. New techniques  like High-frequency trading (HFT) might come up. Or... in chess vocabulary: 'A pawn may promote to a Bishop' (frequency: 0.2%)

The conclusion must be that Actuarial predictions are a kind of 'Actuarial Chess':
So start practicing as an Actuarial Chess Master by Explaining the past and Guiding the future.

In control through better communication!

End of November 2010 the Dutch Regulator (DNB) met with certifying actuaries as well as external auditors. Both meetings were dominated by the theme of "accuracy of reporting" for pension funds, an important DNB monitoring theme.

DNB stressed that all pension fund reports are a key source of surveillance information. With confidence, every Pension Fund stakeholder should be able to rely on the accuracy and completeness of the information in pension fund reports. In practice, this is not always the case. DNB will increasingly hold pension fund boards, certifying actuaries and accountants responsible for taking appropriate actions and - if  necessary - DNB will enforce action.

Topics
Main topics on the accountant-Actuary table are:
- the valuation of technical provisions
- the valuation of the required equity and
- compliance with the prudent person rule.

In control through better communication

The introduction in 2011 of so called 'multi-party meetings' (ie consultation between pension fund management, actuary, accountant (auditor) and regulator DNB) with some larger pension funds will certainly help to improve communication between all concerned parties.

This excellent initiative will also certainly help pension funds to increase control.
Key issue is that the pension Board has (to keep) final responsibility and DNB has to take care that they do not implicitly take over part of this responsibility. Secondly DNB is responsible for an efficient and clear regulation/governance structure. Too many informal consultation meetings might not be efficient and bear the risk of unclear responsibilities. 


Sources:
- Newsletter Pensions DNB (Dutch, 2011)
- Source: Four leaved clover Coin

Twitter Fair Value Accounting

Do you still believe in 'Fair Value Accounting' or 'Market Value' as an excellent accounting principle?

After reading this blog you'll probably have developed a more distinguished view....

Yes...,Fair Value is hard to define...

Probably 'The Fair Value' as such, doesn't exist.

What's 'fair', is often subjective. Therefore 'Fair Value' must be imaginary.


How to earn $9 million by investing '50 cent'?
Answering this question is easy. Look at the next example:

According to 'Business Insider', rapper and business man 'Curtis James Jackson III', alias '50 Cent', promoted the almost worthless HNHI shares during the first weekend of 2011 on Twitter with success!
In no time HNHI shares, including Curtis' 30 million own shares, went up by $.29 a share. Result: almost $ 9 million gain in market cap for just one weekend of tweeting. Not bad!

What actually happened, was:

Don't replicate these kind of dangerous investment marketing jokes...

It's like playing with fire and (therefore) not without risk.

The SEC's attention for Curtis James Jackson's discussable marketing promotion has already been drawn...

Twitter is great, but use it for social activities. Always 'Mind your Steps' at Twitter, especially with regard to financial issues.


Fair Value
This controversial simple Twitter-Investment example shows the weakness of our accounting system. 'Fair values' are of course by definition 'fair', but can be easily influenced by major media players like celebrities or large investment companies in the financial markets.

Controversial Investment marketing
The wrong receipt (Fraud?) to make profit in the investment market is:

1. Select a listed company XYZ in your portfolio that didn't perform well during last years and is clearly undervalued.
2. Hire a celebrity (on basis of a limited fee) to promote XYZ on Twitter.
3. Wait for the shares to go up
4. Cash out before shares go down, ahead of a total collapse. 

Large Investment Companies
Of course - just like me - you might think: large companies don't get mixed up in these matters.  But what to think of the next, slightly changed, approach where large investors makes use of the effect that a lot of small investors follow (or try to outperform) a large investor by flocking (following) or anticipating a large investor's investment strategy without an own investment policy or model (Fair or Fraud?).

A large investor can easily use this flocking effect in a kind of double trick:

1. As a large investor: Select a listed company XYZ in your portfolio that didn't perform well during last years and is likely undervalued.
2. Simulate in the market that your large investment company is interested in buying XYZ shares (spread the rumor, place a non binding call, etc.) or invest a small amount in XYZ.
3. Wait for the shares to go up.
4. Cash out before shares go down on their way to a total collapse.

Case 'Deutsche Bank'
Again, if you don't believe these kind of methods are applied, just go to sleep early tonight and please don't read the 2010 introduction in FT of new computerized trading model called 'Super X' by 'Deutsche Bank'. This new model is all based on 'dark pools'. Nobody really knows or fully understands what is happening in these dark pools and their corresponding algorithms. What about transparency rules? Unfortunately you'll find not a single word about Super X ethics in press articles by Deutsche Bank.

Understandable, because Deutsch Bank doesn't have to worry about transparency or ethics at all. Despite of its ethical code, ominous named 'Passion to Perform', Deutsche Bank admitted criminal wrongdoing over fraudulent U.S. tax shelters by the end of 2010.  Instead of firing those who where responsible, DB simply agreed to pay $554 million to avoid prosecution. After that it was business as usual......

How far does 'passion' go? What seems 'fair' to you and what can we actuaries, learn from this?????

Ethical?

Like in the example(s) above, large investors are able to influence and manipulate the market (price) by acting, fake-acting or non-acting.

From an ethical point of view it gets more and more complicated to earmark such actions as unethical.

Computer programs simply register effects as "if I (computer) do (invest or not-invest or disinvest) 'so', 'this effect' will be 'the result'.

As a consequence these computer programs simply apply and execute these found market principles and structures in the financial markets without a 'moral view' or any form of perception: Fair!, so to speak(??).

Monetary Policy Influence 
Another form of influencing financial markets is by the monetary policy  (read:intervention) of the central Banks. The 2010 Fed intervention could be such an example.

Conclusion

It's clear that the financial markets can be easily influenced by short term media effects, indirect value related investment strategies of large investment companies and Central Bank's monetary policy.

Irrespective from the question wetter it's "Fair Value or Not Fair Value", we'll have to deal with 'temporary unfair market effects' that can have a major impact on a company's value.

As a consequence it's not 'fair' nor 'wise' to base a company's value on the 'fair value' on December 31th 24.00 hours. Temporary market volatility should - one way or the other - be excluded in valuations (moving average?).

With regard to your own private investments or life, keep in mind:

If something sounds too good to be true …
it probably is...

Related Links/Sources:
- How To Make $10 Million From Just One Weekend Of Tweeting
- "If it's good enough for Buffet, it's good enough for me"
- "No Amount Of QE Will Be Able To Keep The Current Stock Market Bubble From Bursting"
- Fair Value or Not Fair Value
- How Much Influence Does The Fed Have?
- Fraudwatchers
- The Latest Celebrity Stock Promoter / Pump and Dumper? 
- CurtKoCool 
- Cartoon '50 Cent' 
- MarketWatch HHI
- FT: Deutsche Bank unveils new trading model (2010) 
- Daffy Duck 

The Life Expectancy Variance Monster

After 'age', what would be the most important explanatory factor with regard to mortality rates or constructing life tables?

As actuaries we've demonstrated our innovation capabilities by developing life tables not only based on 'age' and 'gender', but also (two dimensional) on 'time', 'generation' and 'year of birth'. This helped us to extrapolate future mortality rates in order to predict future longevity with more accuracy.

However, despite our noble initiatives, these developments turn out to be insufficient to put the Longevity Variance Monster back in his cage.

Modern 'life expectancy at birth' predictions for periods of 40 to 50 year ahead, lead to 95% confidence intervals of 12 years or more. Unusable outcomes .....

Let's not even discuss more necessary accurate confidence intervals of 99% or more ....

In our attempt (duty?) to moderate and diminish future life expectancy variance, we'll have to develop new instruments.

The more we know which risk factors 'are responsible for the increase in 'life expectancy', the better we can estimate and diminish future variance.

One of those new approaches is to calculate life expectancies on basis of postcodes.

This new insight can be helpful, but there's a much more important risk factor that has to be included in our life expectancy predictions to definitely kill the Longevity Variance Monster:

Self-perception of aging

In a 2002 research "Longevity From Positive Self-Perceptions" by Levy ( et al.) it became undeniable clear that:

• negative self-perceptions diminish life expectancy;
• positive self-perceptions prolong life expectancy.
  

Older people with more positive self-perceptions of aging, measured up to 23 years earlier, lived on average (median survival) 7.6 years longer than those with less positive self-perceptions of aging. This advantage remained after age, gender, socioeconomic status, loneliness, and functional health were included as covariates.

Top 6 Life Expectancy Risk Factors

Here's Levy's top 6 list of risk factors on life expectancy (ordered from greatest to least impact on life expectancy):

1. Age
2. Self-Perceptions of aging
3. Gender
4. Loneliness
5. Functional health
6. Socio-economic status

As we can not change 'age' nor 'gender', let's put some more research on the other risk factors.

Once we achieve to 'explain' the cause of increase of life expectancy on basis of 'new' (soft) risk factors, we - as a society - will also be able to manage life expectancy better (information, education, training, coaching, etc.).

In this way actuaries can help society so that people live longer and stay happy in good health. All on basis of of a sound financial pension and health system, as predicted life expectancy will show a smaller variance.

Help to kill the Life Expectancy Variance Monster.....

Happy 2011, with better expectations and smaller variance!

Sources/related Links:

- Why population forecasts should be probabilistic
- On line Postcode Life Expectancy Tool
- Longevity From Positive Self-Perceptions
- Predicting successful aging (2010)