Price of Greed and Fear

Despite of all our knowledge, training and experience we sometimes decide to follow our heart instead of our head.
What's wrong with that?

Answer:
Nothing, as long as your decisions are not based on greed and fear

Illustration: We all know.....

I. How to advice on getting a better reward/risk ratio.
Modern Portfolio management (MPT) helps us.

Risk/return trade-off between bonds and stocks1980-2004 (AAII)
Bonds: 60% 5-year Treasury Notes+40% LT Treasury Bonds
Stocks:(S&P 500)

II. The performance/time model of stocks

III. Asset allocation is key behind portfolio returns
So it's not about Market Timing!

Moreover Market Timing is a dangerous game as research firm DALBAR showed.

Although the S&P 500® 1988-2007 Index had an annualized return of 12%, the average equity fund investor (in equity mutual funds) only generated a 5% return and market timers, who tried to outsmart the market by timing their inflows and outflows, generated an annualized loss of 1%.

Market Strong ... Investors Wrong

*Measures returns of investors in equity mutual funds. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, DALBAR

Greed and Fear
When the asset strategy has been chosen and implemented, it comes down to strong nerves, to hold this strategy.

But nothing human is strange to us. Who can resist the pressure of shareholders, advisors or analysts to question the current strategy after 2 or 3 years of extremely high (or low) stock returns?

In straightening out and defending your policy, stakeholders and advisors will often argue that you're a rearview mirror actuary or board member. They'll stress that the actual situation is not comparable with any situation in the past.

However, always keep in mind the words of Sir John Templeton (1912-2008) :

The four most expensive words in the English language are
'This time it's different'

So how successful are you, in cashing in on your emotions an withstanding pressure?

Still, if you nevertheless give in and are going to change your bond/stock ratio based on fear, greed or hype, all bets are off.

Example



As is clear form the example above, when your strategy is vulnerable to heart cries, you'll end up in the famous Pork Cycle , which - in this case - leads to a return level beneath that of risk free assets. The price of Greed and Fear!

Lesson
When you've set your assets according your chosen asset strategy, only change this strategy when the underlying long term asset-modeling parameters substantially change. In every other case, don't decide on basis of 'heart over head'.

Define and allocate equity (as security) for an 'up front' defined period of time in wich you're willing to except lower or even a defined maximum negative performance. Agree this strategy up front with the supervisory board and national Supervisors.

Sources: MyMoneyBlog , Schwab, DALBAR

Whistleblower Risk Management

We all know Risk Management is key in our business.


Yet, almost all risk models (e.g. Coso) emphasize mainly on known or knowable risks.



Of course, as we could have seen in the 2008 credit crisis, the art of Risk management is in managing the unknown or unknowable risks.

But how?


Let's try to learn from two main major accidents:

I. The Challenger shuttle disaster (1986)
The accident was caused by failing O-Rings. Warnings of many engineers were overruled and ignored. This crash was the consequence of a typical effect called GROUPTHINK. Groups naturally look for consensus and will often come up with a false consensus, even when individual members disagree.
Watch a video of the space shuttle Challenger disaster that illustrates this GROUPTHINK phenomenon.

Other examples are the Columbia shuttle disaster and the 9/11 attacks. In all cases Management failed because the information suggesting a disaster was weakly transmitted within an bureaucratic system, and managers failed to authorize action because of bad communication and performance or time pressure.

II. The 2008 credit crisis

• Underestimating early signals
  The first indication of the coming credit crisis was the collapse of Enron in 2003, uncovered by whistleblower Sherron Watkins.
  
  After the collapse, the FED refused to come out with new 'rules based' guidelines . A Senate investigation showed that - starting already in 2000 - some major U.S. financial institutions had "deliberately misused structured finance techniques". But the Fed and the SEC underestimated the situation, kept to their 'principles based' system and consequently missed the opportunity to to flex their muscle by regulating market conditions for subprime mortgages.
  
  Lesson: It's not about 'rules OR principles', Football Or Soccer, but it's about 'Rules AND Principles'.
  
  

• Mixed Central Banks (FED) responsibilities
  Central Banks, The Fed in particular, have at the same time two main responsibilities with regard to (other) financial institutions:
  1. Supervision
  2. Providing financial (banking) services
  
  Those two functions clearly conflict with each other. It's impossible to independently supervise the financial company you're financing at the same time. Supervisory advises will be suspicious by definition.
  
  Secondly you can't supervise yourself as central bank. Therefore, every country needs an independent (that is 'without central bank board members'), professional supervisory board, that audits and supervises the central bank and the national bailout plan(s).
  
  
• Whistleblowers
  How could the credit crisis technically happen?
  Not an official, but a more outside kind of whistleblower, businessman Warren Buffet, warns in a 2003 BBC article that “Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction and contracts devised by madmen". The financial world isn't listening.
  
  Derivatives like Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO's,) were developed to (re)fund the subprime loans. CDO's are packaged portfolios of credit risk, made up from different sliced and diced loans and bonds. They were hard to uncover without a whistleblower. At last an anonymous banker e-mails journalist Gillian Tett of the Financial Times about the situation. Only after she publices early 2007 what's wrong, the dices start rolling. This case also stresses the important role of journalism and whistleblowers in our aim for a healthy transparent financial market.
  
  
• The Greed Game
  One can argue about the roots of the credit crisis. However, essential in the 2008 credit crisis were, or still are, the excessive remuneration practices at private equity companies, hedge funds and banks. They encouraged unhealthy and excessive risk-taking. Key is the lack of balance between possible earnings and possible losses of board members.
  
  To prevent unhealthy pressure management (with groupthink effects), board members' total rewards should always be in line with the long term realized added value of the company and not be based on yearly P&L profits or short term added value.
  

Manage the unknown risks
Risk Management is not a static, but a dynamic process.

To gain and behold control of the unknown risks, it's necessary to create a transparent organization and company-process that guarantees whistleblowers' and whisperers' (= whistleblowers, that wish to stay anonymous) safety and encourages and even rewards compliance reports from employees, clients or any other stakeholders.

Because of GROUPTHINK and - on the other hand - possible negative employee outcomes (demotion, dismissal, etc) in case a reported compliance issue turns out to be compliant after all, it's important that whistleblowers are always given the opportunity to report directly, anonymously and safely to the independent federal Supervisor. Employees must have the choice to report internal within their company (small compliance matters) or to report directly to the federal Supervisory board.

Conclusions

• Separate the Supervisory and Financial Services functions of the central banks (FED)
  
  
• Redesign whistleblowers management
  Whistleblowers should have the opportunity to report compliance issues directly and anonimously to an independent federal Supervisory board.
  
  Whistleblowers that choose to report within a company, should always directly reporte to the compliance officer, the executive board and the supervisory board. On top of this they should always, especially in case of discharge, dismissal or demotion, have the right to escalate to the federal Supervisor.
  
  
• Change supervisory procedures and criteria
  Approval of (company) board members by the federal Supervisor should als be based upon:
  
  1. The 'ethical track record' of a candidate
  2. The feasibility of, in macro economic perspective, "realistic and balanced" board member performance parameters.
     
     The federal Supervisor should audit and approve the existence of a consistent 'company reward plan' that guarantees a sound and measurable balance between long term company results and board member rewards.
     
     CEO's that haven't established measurable long term added value for their company, shouldn't receive any bonus or golden parachute at all.