Happy Actuarial New Year

Did you know there are more than 100 "new year's days" in a calendar year?
It just depends on where you live or what you believe.

Before 1752, Americans celebrated New Year's Day on March 25th (Lady Day according to the old Celtic religion and the Feast of the Annunciation according to the Christian religion).

Great Britain and its colonies changed their New Year's celebrations to January 1st when they changed from the old Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar in 1751.

How shall we define our actuarial new year?

Read more about it on

Celebrate New Year's Day
Every Month of the Year!

Price of Greed and Fear

Despite of all our knowledge, training and experience we sometimes decide to follow our heart instead of our head.
What's wrong with that?

Answer:
Nothing, as long as your decisions are not based on greed and fear

Illustration: We all know.....

I. How to advice on getting a better reward/risk ratio.
Modern Portfolio management (MPT) helps us.

Risk/return trade-off between bonds and stocks1980-2004 (AAII)
Bonds: 60% 5-year Treasury Notes+40% LT Treasury Bonds
Stocks:(S&P 500)

II. The performance/time model of stocks

III. Asset allocation is key behind portfolio returns
So it's not about Market Timing!

Moreover Market Timing is a dangerous game as research firm DALBAR showed.

Although the S&P 500® 1988-2007 Index had an annualized return of 12%, the average equity fund investor (in equity mutual funds) only generated a 5% return and market timers, who tried to outsmart the market by timing their inflows and outflows, generated an annualized loss of 1%.

Market Strong ... Investors Wrong

*Measures returns of investors in equity mutual funds. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, DALBAR

Greed and Fear
When the asset strategy has been chosen and implemented, it comes down to strong nerves, to hold this strategy.

But nothing human is strange to us. Who can resist the pressure of shareholders, advisors or analysts to question the current strategy after 2 or 3 years of extremely high (or low) stock returns?

In straightening out and defending your policy, stakeholders and advisors will often argue that you're a rearview mirror actuary or board member. They'll stress that the actual situation is not comparable with any situation in the past.

However, always keep in mind the words of Sir John Templeton (1912-2008) :

The four most expensive words in the English language are
'This time it's different'

So how successful are you, in cashing in on your emotions an withstanding pressure?

Still, if you nevertheless give in and are going to change your bond/stock ratio based on fear, greed or hype, all bets are off.

Example



As is clear form the example above, when your strategy is vulnerable to heart cries, you'll end up in the famous Pork Cycle , which - in this case - leads to a return level beneath that of risk free assets. The price of Greed and Fear!

Lesson
When you've set your assets according your chosen asset strategy, only change this strategy when the underlying long term asset-modeling parameters substantially change. In every other case, don't decide on basis of 'heart over head'.

Define and allocate equity (as security) for an 'up front' defined period of time in wich you're willing to except lower or even a defined maximum negative performance. Agree this strategy up front with the supervisory board and national Supervisors.

Sources: MyMoneyBlog , Schwab, DALBAR

Credit Crisis Predicted

Lyndon LaRouche, economist, long-range forecaster, risk manager 'avant la lettre' and one of the initiators behind the SDI-project (Strategic Defense Initiative) in the 80s.

With firm quotes like "there has been no economic growth on this planet, since the end of the 1960s. None, if you measure the right magnitudes", he takes stand in the sometimes overoptimistic and misleading world we've created.

Back in 1995, in Germany, he stated "We are at the end of an epoch".

He warned that a global financial bankruptcy and collapse would be under way and introduced in an econometric form his 'famous' "Typical Collapse Function" or "Triple Curve"to illustrate that power statement.

In his daring view, he describes the interplay of the three curves (non mathematical directionalities) that characterize the collapse process:

1. Physical-economic input/output (bottom curve)
   The productivity and functioning of the physical economy, upon which all human existence depends;
2. Monetary aggregates (middle curve)
   The increase in monetary aggregates (approximately represented by money supply measures; injections)
3. Financial aggregates (upper curve)
   Growth—which can become hyperbolic growth—in financial aggregates of all kinds: run-up of debts and other obligations, speculation in currencies, stock markets, futures (derivatives), etc.

As in the case of a "typical collapse function," the interaction of the upper two curves sucks the underlying physical economy dry.

But at a certain critical point (around 2000 in the USA), no matter how much money is injected in the economy, the financial bubbles cannot be kept aloft! The rate of rate of growth of monetary aggregates becomes higher than the rate of rate of growth for financial aggregates. In graphical terms, this is the "inevitable crossover" point of the middle, monetary curve, breaking up through the top financial curve.

Although this looks like intuitive econometric science, LaRouche illustrates this with some striking examples.

In the year 2000 LaRouche stated that compared with a worldwide GDP of about $41 trillion, the total amount of financial aggregate in short-term obligations was over $400 trillion. In other words, at least 10 times the amount of the total annual product of the world as a whole at that time. "

In 2008 he publishes in 'The Time Has Come for a New System':

• We are a credit system, not a monetary system.
• Outstanding obligations: $1.4 quadrillion, derivatives, short-term obligations of speculative nature
• This mess is coming down.
• System will be put into bankruptcy, by governments

And than to realize that there are still leading prominent professionals that like to make us believe that it's just some limited subprime issue. Regretful, it's the other way around. Subprime will just turn out to be the proverbial little stroke that'll fell the great oak.

Read more about LaRouche Writings

Let's hope that LaRouche is a pessimistic man....