Zero Problems Risk Management

More and more we actuaries and risk managers become aware that our risk models can't just be based on numbers and statistics exclusively.

Some examples:

Systemic risk

The recent financial crisis made it clear that a 'mono risk approach' on a sole risk-object (mortgage, fund-investment) is insufficient.

Investments and loans are embedded in a worldwide sea of connected financial instruments and reinvestments. Systemic risk has to be included in our models.

Main challenge here is that systematic risk essentially depends on macroeconomic and (mostly) irrational factors. Further, systemic risk is related to the structure and dynamics of the market. More than numbers.....

Supervisory Herding Risk

In their effort to control and support financial institutions like banks, pension funds and insurance companies, country supervisors, regulators and 'accounting standards boards', defined a meticulously set of guidance rules (Basel I/II/II, Solvency I/II, Qis-I-V, IFRS, FAS, AIFMD, FTK, FIRM, etc.,etc.)

Financial institutions not only confirmed and adopted to those new rules, but - in their rush and driven by cost and time pressure - also implicitly (and often unintentionally) declared those same imposed rules and rationales as their own business 'Risk Appetite'. This way, most financial Institutions became so called: 'Supervisory Compliant'.

Instead of  expliciting their specific company-targets and successively developing their own correspondent risk appetite and risk framework, they incorporated the supervisor's risk philosophy. 

Without a sound own (board) risk vision that would undoubtedly have included some extra safety on 'company specific risk issues', financial institutions became - like a herd - all in the same way extremely vulnerable to (less defined) external risks.

Summarized:

Overregulation increases Herding Risk

Financial institutions all measure and respond to regulated risks in the same way. Supervisory Herding Risk is born.....

Too Much Focus Risk

As a consequence of pre-subscribed risk categories and ruling by law or (accounting) standards, there's the risk of 'too much focus' on specific risks while forgetting, denying or neglecting other important risks. Remember, the devil is in the (correlating) details....

Here's a useful, but not exhaustive, checklist to keep track on your risk models...

Average Premium Risk	Diversification Risk	Matching Risk
Commodity risk	Employer Continuity Risk	Operational risk
Compliance Risk	Environmental Risk	Outsourcing Risk
Compliance Risk	Equity Risk	Oversight Risk
Concentration Risk	Herding Risk	Price Inflation Risk
Counterparty Risk	Interest rate risk	Property Derivatives Risk
Coverage Ratio Risk	IT Risk	Reinsurance Risk
Credit Risk	Legal risk	Reinvestment risk
Culture Risk	Legislative Risk	Reputation risk
Currency Risk	Liability Risk	Sex Calculation risk
Default Risk	Liquidity risk	Strategic risk
Deflation risk	Longevity Risk	System Risk
Disaster Risk	Market Risk	Systemic Risk
Discount Risk	Matching Risk	Wage Cost Inflation Risk

ALM Simplifying Risk

Univariate models are killing and even multivariate models have proven to be too vulnerable and too limited in the recent crisis. It's not just about correlation and covariance matrices. What we need is an self-explaining model. A model  that predicts or generates expected values in an economic context, depending on exogenous economic variables like inflation rate, GDP-Level, etc. and that is based on the same structured historical economic data-set.

We need 'Asset Liability Modeling New Style' and not only Stress Testing or
advanced and excellent Crash Modelling as well explained by EMB.

Geopolitical Risk

With Europe and Japan as recent examples, it's clear that risks come from everywhere around the world.

The consequence of earthquakes (Japan, Australia), a possible  country default (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, ..), political instability (Libya, Ivory Coast, ..), war threat (Vietnam,Iraq, ..), financial easing (US, Europe,...), on our economic system, prices and financial institutions seems substantial and - moreover- predictable.

More than just trying to catch and capitalize these kind of risks in our risk models, we need to develop (financial) mechanisms and products that can cope as best as possible with these kind of risks.

The Riskmap 2011, Managing Risk | Maximising Opportunity, offers a good description of the actual risks that influence our lives and risk models.

A nice example is the recent (unexpected) leading role that France took in action against Libya.  'Riskmap 2011' mentions the 'Arabic Poll 2010' that clearly shows (despite the lack of sympathy for president Sarkozy) the trust and sympathy for France. France clearly outperforms the US and president Obama  unfortunately has lost the trust of the Arabic world... Take a look at the next slide summary (or the original complete pdf):  

Arab Public Opinion Poll 2010 Summary

Arab Public Opinion Poll 20... by Jos Berkemeijer

The Arabic poll shows that the prime minister of Turkey, Erdogan, has clearly gained  the confidence and trust of the  Arabic countries. With Ergodan, Turkey - at the cross road between East and West - takes a leading role in the 'World Risk Management Process'.  Ergodan's Risk Philosophy, invented  by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu,   is 'Zero Problems'.....

Perhaps that should be the philosophy of actuaries too...

Zero Problems

Conclusion

From now on 'Modeling Risk' is more than just a financial exercise.
It's building scenario's, mechanisms and products that can cope with this risky world.  Success as actuary or risk manager!

Related Links:

- Committee (behaviour) assessment tool
- Control Risks:Riskmap 2011
- Arabic Poll 2010
- Supervisory Compliant
- Maplecroft Risk Maps 
- EMB: How to Model a Crash (REVO) 

Fukushima Risk Management

With all due respect for the Japanese risk managers, engineers and the Japanese people in general: The latest 2011 M=8.9 Earthquake in Japan made clear that the current Risk Models, as well as Risk Management itself, have tragically failed.

Shortcomings
Shortcomings in headlines:

• Underestimation of the probability of a M=8.9 (M>8) event
• Risk Modeling mainly focused on 'direct' earthquake effects
• Underestimation of cumulative correlated devastating effects that occurred as a consequence of a combination of Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Nuclear Disasters and Physical Concentration (4 reactors in a row!).
  
  

Frequency?
It's true, the worldwide annual frequency of a serious earthquake with a magnitude of 8 or more (M>8) seems small....

Yet - no matter how low the probability- the consequences (loss) is unacceptable if the damage in case of an event (like an earthquake M>8) is not manageable, exceeds a country's financial recuperation power, or devastates thousands of lives...

End of Time?

Lots of worrywarts think the end of time has come, as severe earthquakes are increasing.

Simple statistics show that this is not (yet ?) the case:

The expected average Magnitude value of all earthquakes with M>=7 over the period 1950-2011 (March) is M_a=7.6 with a standard deviation of SD= 0.4. The average value of the last 10 years turns out M_a=7.4 with the same SD (0.4).

Nevertheless, when we examine the graphic more closely, there seems a light (significant?) increase in large magnitude earthquakes in recent decades.....


Back to the year 0
For what it's worth, the average magnitude for M>=7 earthquakes over a longer period from 0 to 2011 (March) , turns out in line with M_a=7.6 and a SD=0.44. Or in graphics:

History Earthquakes in GoogeMaps
Finally, take a look at the history of all earthquakes with a magnitude of 7 or higher on GoogleMaps... (take look at your country!)


Earthquakes, Magnitude> 7, years 0-2011 weergeven op een grotere kaart

Let's hope and pray for the Japanese people that that the brave engineers who are fighting the current meltdown at Fukushima will succeed and survive.....

Related links
- Spreadsheet (Excel) Earthquakes 0-2011 (March), M>=7
- Crash Course Earthquake calculation by Professor Nicholas Pinter
- Effect of Seismic Risk Measures on Japanese Housing Prices
- Earthquake Software
- Download Earthquake data from USGS
- Earthquake Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
- PPT:Japan’s Nuclear Energy Program(2003-2004)
- Design criteria Japanes Nuclear Plants  
- Prediction of ground motion
- Seismic Risk Evaluation (2004)
- Earthquake Facts 
- Earthquake FAQS 
- GeoBatch: Earthquakes (history M>=7)
- GoogleMaps: Earthquakes (history M>=7)

Groupthink

IMF evaluated its role and performance in the recent financial and economic crisis.

Cause

In a 2011 crisis report with the short title: 'IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis:IMF Surveillance in 2004–07 ', IMF concludes that the main cause of their inadequate response during the crisis was:

Groupthink

IMF’s ability to detect important vulnerabilities and risks and alert the membership, was undermined by a complex interaction of factors, many of which had been flagged before but had not been fully addressed.

The IMF’s ability to correctly identify the escalating risks was hindered by:

1. A high degree of groupthink 
2. Intellectual capture
3. A general mindset that a major financial crisis was unlikely
4. Inadequate analytical approaches
5. Weak internal governance
6. Lack of incentives to work across units and raise contrarian views
7. A review process that did not “connect the dots” or ensure follow-up
8. Some impact of 'political constraints'....

Recommendations

IMF suggests some recommendations on how to strengthen its ability to discern risks and vulnerabilities and to warn in the future. Main point is to enhance the effectiveness of surveillance: it is critical to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Board, Management, and senior staff, and to establish a clear accountability framework.

Looking forward, IMF needs to

1. 
   Create an environment that encourages candor and considers dissenting views
    
2. Modify incentives to “speak truth to power”
    
3. Better integrate macroeconomic and financial sector issues
   
   
4. Overcome the silo mentality and insular culture; Deliver a clear, consistent message on the global outlook and risks.

Recognize Groupthink
Groupthink is not just something happening to IMF or 'other organisations'. We, financial institutions, all suffer somehow or somewhat from the Groupthink Virus.

How can we recognize Groupthink?
Derived from an article by Irving Janis, the inventor of the word Groupthink, let's take a look at some explicit signs of Groupthink:

1. Winning Mood syndrome
   A common illusion of success (Folie à deux), invulnerability, over-optimism, unanimity and risk-taking as a consequence.
2. Collective rationalization
   Managers, employees discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions
3. 
   Repression or Ridicule
   Direct pressure on and ridicule of  individuals who express disagreement with or doubt about the majority view or the view of the leader
4. Fear
   Fear of disapproval for deviating from the group consensus. Fear from or doubt about expressing your opinion.
5. Manipulating
   Remaining silent in a discussion is implicitly interpreted as agreeing.Obviously 'wrong' arguments are used to achieve a certain goal or policy.
6. Disrespect
   Stereotyped views of out-groups or enemy leaders as evil, weak or stupid. Good or serious ideas of colleagues are rejected on basis of the source instead of 'judged by the facts'.
7. Moral Blindness
   Unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of the in-group. Lack of discussion about ethical or moral aspects of certain decision.
8. Miscommunication and Misinformation
   Information, bottom up or top-down is (deliberately) strongly filtered
9. Idolization
   Idolization of the leader or of certain five star employees.

Lessons Learned
If you recognize some of the above signs in your organization, it is time for action.
Discuss it, do not accept it and if you cannot change it... LEAVE!

A humorous example of Misinformation are the quotes of Iraq's minister of (Mis)Informaton, Al-Sahaf, during the 2003 Iraq war.
Enjoy, laugh and learn.....



Make sure your board presentation is not based on' sahaf-statements' but on simple provable actuarial facts....

Related links/sources:
- 8 signs of groupthink
- What is Groupthink?
- IMF Crisis Report 2011