Feb 26, 2013

Humor: Actuarial Creativity

As actuaries we've studied a lot in life. And to keep up with actuarial science we'll probably keep studying until our personal mortality rate hits us finally in the back.

Although study brought us to the top of financial and statistic modeling, there's a small but fatal risk that we become so engrossed in our work that we loose our creativity or ability to solve things in a simple way.

Test

To test whether you're still a creative 'simplist', let's do a short 3 question test. Here it is:

Question 1
 "Show how it is possible to determine the height of a tall building with the aid of a barometer."



If you think you've solved this high school level problem, go to the next question

Question 2
 "Solve question 1 with another method."

If you think you've solved this problem as wel, go to the final question

Question 3
 "Solve question 1 with 4 other methods."

Evaluation
Although actuaries never give up, there's a slight chance you had to surrender and are longing for the answer.
In that case (only), read further for the answer.

Answer: The Barometer Fable
Bob Pease (Nat.Semi.) records the story of the Physics student who got the following question in an exam: "You are given an accurate barometer, how would you use it to determine the height of a skyscraper ?"

  1. He answered: "Go to the top floor, tie a long piece of string to the barometer, let it down 'till it touches the ground and measure the length of the string".

    The examiner wasn't satisfied, so they decided to interview the guy: "Can you give us another method, one which demonstrates your knowledge of Physics ?"
     
  2.  "Sure, go to the top floor, drop the barometer off, and measure how long before it hits the ground……"

    "Not, quite what we wanted, care to try again ?"
     
  3. "Make a pendulum of the barometer, measure its period at the bottom, then measure its period at the top……"

    "..another try ?…."
     
  4. "Measure the length of the barometer, then mount it vertically on the ground on a sunny day and measure its shadow, measure the shadow of the skyscraper….."

    "….and again ?…."
     
  5. "walk up the stairs and use the barometer as a ruler to measure the height of the walls in the stairwells."

    "…One more try ?"
     
  6. "Find where the janitor lives, knock on his door and say
    'Please, Mr Janitor, if I give you this nice Barometer, will you tell me the height of this building ?"


Find more than 140 solutions and read the original famous Barometer Fable, as published in 1968 in an article  by Alexander Calandra.

Warning!
Keep in mind that not every method leads to satisfactory results.
An uncertainty analysis of determining a building height using a barometer, developed by Israel Urieli, shows that this method is not accurate at all!

So the surprising news is that the first two alternative methods mentioned above are more accurate than the method you learn at high school.

Finally
It's always best when you can solve an (actuarial) problem in more than one way and the outcomes point in the same direction. The more a specific solution comes to front by applying different methods and/or data, the more confident you can be that the outcome is robust.

Used Sources

Feb 5, 2013

Supervision on Supervision

On February 1 2013, the Dutch Minister of Finance, in close consultation with the Dutch Supervisor 'De Nederlandsche Bank' (DNB), announced he nationalized the Dutch Bank-Insurer SNS Reaal.

Intervention was necessary to prevent grave threats to the Dutch financial stability and economy.

This intervention shows again that the European stress tests fail, as was already predicted in a Quartz article called "Forget the stress tests: Europe’s banks are a worrisome mystery" on October 2, 2012. Risk managers have to to a better job. Work to be done!

Role of the Supervisor
The intervention also raised the question about the role of the Dutch supervisor DNB in this debacle. Officially the (Dutch) Minister of Finance is responsible for the supervision on the national supervisor. In practice this role is delegated to the national 'Supreme Audit Institutions' (SAIs).



A special  European Committee Working  Group assessed the scope of the mandate of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) and its proper functioning with respect to the main financial supervisor  (FSA)  for
prudential oversight on banks.

Thirteen (of the twenty seven) European countries participated in the SAIs research.

Three aspects were analyzed:
  1. Mandate: Has the local SAI a mandate to audit the supervisory role?
  2. Access:  Has the local SAI actually access to audit bank files of the supervisor\supervisor
  3. Test: Did SAI successfully test the completeness of the bank files

Here are  that are disappointing results of the work group for the main 11 countries:


Yes* = Yes , with condition of confidentiality

Conclusion
Although a general approach of (SAI) supervision on (Supervisor) seems useless and even silly, it's clear that the current supervisory grip and transparency is undeniably inadequate.

In this case, we certainly need a strong supervision on national supervisors in Europe to prevent accidents like SNS. In other words: Back to the old 'Four Eyes Principle'...


Finally
In a letter to the Dutch  House of Representatives the Dutch SAI states:
"The Council of Ministers agreed to the introduction of a European supervisory mechanism for banks, with a central role for the ECB, on 13 December 2012. 

To safeguard the information position of the European parliament and the member states, the European Court of Auditors should be able to audit the supervision exercised by the ECB.

The European Court of Auditors' current mandate does not allow it to do so. This creates an audit gap at European level: arrangements are not in place for the independent audit of the ECB's organisation and exercise of its 
supervisory tasks and authority. "

Links
- State of the Netherlands nationalises SNS REAAL
- Forget the stress tests: Europe’s banks are a worrisome mystery
Points for consideration in the Dutch House of Representatives
- Points for consideration in the Dutch House of Representatives (Dutch)
- 4 Eyes Principle Cartoon

Jan 28, 2013

U.S. Inflation 1666-2012

As promised, a nice Mathematica overview of U.S Inflation history.

View and play around with these inflation data to 'grasp' inflation long and short term behavior...

Download the Mathematica CDF player if you haven't already, it's well worth it....

If you can't load the application on this blog, or the panel range becomes wider than the width of the blog column, go here: Stand alone U.S. Inflation website




Jan 20, 2013

SMPLFCTN

As an actuary, you probably grew up with that famous quote of Einstein:

Everything Should Be Made as Simple as Possible,
But Not Simpler.

However, as 'Quote Investigator' shows, there is no direct evidence that Einstein crafted this aphorism...

Hmmmm.... Never mind.... as this quote is clearly redundant and therefore can be simplified....

So, it's enough to stick to the subjective concept of 'keep it simple'.....

'Simple', simply means 'easy to understand'.  

If we would try to present or explain something 'too simple', we are in fact making it harder to understand and therefore 'more complicated'.

Example
If we try to explain that we can estimate the area of a circle (approx. 3.14159...; radius=1) in practice by a n-sided polygon, a three year old child ;-) will buy your simplification in case of  a 12-sided polygon.




Oversimplified, or Worse: Desimplified
In case of a square (4-sided polygon), he'll probably raise his eyebrow, as you oversimplified the topic. And in case of a triangle you'll probably have lost him completely. You desimplified and thereby complicated your case to the opposite of what you untended : a clear understanding.



Simplification Criterion
Keep in mind that, like in the case above, you must develop a criterion when you simplify things. In the above example, a criterion could (e,g) be that the area of the polygon shouldn't differ more than 10% of the original circle and must have a relative simple (round) answer. This criterion would lead to a 12-sided polygon as an adequate simplification example.


And of course, we have to test this ex-ante 12-sided criterion in practice by means of a questionnaire.


Simplification is Complicated
However, 'simplification' as process, is not simple at all. In practice simplification can be used to reduce things that are:
  1. complicated (not simple, but knowable) or 
  2. complex (not simple and never fully knowable) 
In an article called 'Simplicity: A New Model',  Jurgen Appelo tries to simplify the complex world of simplicity linked concepts. He states that simplification means 'make understandable', which means moving it vertically, from the top of the model to the bottom in the following Appelo-illustration.

Anyhow, there's much to learn about simplicity related topics.....   

Let's finish with an excellent example of a need for simplification : 

Simplifying 'Complexity of financial regulation'
In an excellent presentation, Executive Director Financial Stability of the Bank of England,  Andrew Haldane, pleas and argues to simplify financial regulation.

It turns out that the growing number of regulation rules and principles (e.g. Basel III) has an adverse effect on taming the crisis.

Also 
the traditional Merton-Markowitz approach that assumes a known probability distribution for future market risk and enables portfolio risk to be calculated and thereby priced and hedged, offers no help to solve the current crisis.
Haldane concludes that "More simple regulation  based on 'Optimal choice under uncertainty' is necessarily. Haldane concludes:

"Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex.  Regulation of modern finance is complex, almost certainly too complex.  That configuration spells trouble.

As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity.  Because complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded in simplicity, not complexity. 


Delivering that would require an about-turn from the regulatory community from the path followed for the better part of the past 50 years.  If a once-in-a-lifetime crisis is not able to deliver that change, it is not clear what will.  


To ask today’s regulators to save us from tomorrow’s crisis using yesterday’s toolbox is to ask a border collie to catch a frisbee by first applying Newton’s Law of Gravity.
"


Haldane's (2012) presentation called 'Ensuring Long-Term Financial Stability', or more popular 'The dog and the frisbee', is a breakthrough in managing, modeling and controlling Risk and financial future results. It's a MUST read for actuaries and board members in the financial industry.

Finally
From now in, actuaries can simply start 'helping' as a border collie!

Sources/Links
- The dog and the frisbee
- Risk models must be torn up
- Mathematica: Play with Polygons
- Einstein's Simple Quote Investigated
- Complex versus Complicated
Complicated vs complex vs chaotic
- Simplicity a new model

Jan 18, 2013

From Economic Scenarios to Informed Guesses

Defining a long term investment strategy build on one chosen economic scenario is reckless.

As crystal ball gazing is no option, defining strategies on more (multi based) economic scenarios makes more sense, but often ignores the underlying forces that drive those economic developments.

And precisely these elemental forces are the drivers for a dynamic investment strategy.

Informed Guesses

What remains as next best solution, is to define an investment strategy on basis of what is called 'Informed Guesses'.

This implies that a strategy is not just build on professional guessing (statistical & actuarial modeling; Monte Carlo, etc). The key to success in the approach is this word 'Informed'...


As board members of financial institutions can not delegate or outsource their investment strategy, they have no other option than to inform themselves about the economic, social,  psychological, financial and statistical underlying forces and to formulate a dynamic investment strategy based on those basic forces.
 
Global Trends 2030
An excellent example of mapping these future driving forces is a December 2012 report published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) called 'Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds'.

The NIC report does not seek to predict the future, which would be an impossible mission. Instead, it provides a framework that stimulates thinking about our world's rapid and vast geopolitical changes. Resulting in possible global future directions and implications during the next 15-20 years. 

The report defines 4 mega trends and 4 potential worlds:

Mega Trends 
  1. Individual Empowerment and the growth of a global middle class 
  2. Diffusion of Power from states to informal networks and coalitions
  3. Demographic changes, growing urbanization, migration, and aging
  4. Increased demand for food, water, and energy. 

Potential Worlds
  1. Stalled Engines
    Most plausible worst-case scenario: Increasing risks of interstate conflict. The Us draws inward and globalization stalls. 
  2. Fusion Most plausible best-case outcome. Collaboration of China and the Us, leading to broader global cooperation.
  3. Gini-Out-of-theBottle
    Inequalities explode as some countries become big winners and others fail. Inequalities within countries increase social tensions. Without completely disengaging, the Us is no longer the “global policeman.” 
  4. Nonstate World World driven by new technologies, nonstate actors take the lead in confronting global challenges
 
Let's take a look at some interesting charts from this report:

I. Asia's dominant growing consumer power...
 

II. U.S.-Asia's  combined World Power...


III. Europe, GDP Dominant in 2030 ?


IV. U.S.GDP, Any way : Going down...

Conclusion
"Global Trends 2030"is an interesting and relevant document for investment planning, that I would recommend to read, to draw your own conclusions.

A more general conclusion - as stated by NIC - could be that we are heading for a transformed world, in which “no country – whether the US, China, or any other large country – will be a hegemonic power.”

No matter what trend or potential world, one thing seems inevitable:
the influential power of the U.S. that's vital for our world's economy will decline.....


Success with defining new investment strategies!

Bye the way.... Actuaries help you out on your investment strategy:






Sources/Links:
- Escher Image from Freakingnews
- Escher: Hand with Reflecting Sphere (1935)
- Zero hedge: The world in 2030
- World in 2030 (original report (2012)

Dec 31, 2012

Happy New Year (2013)

Happy New Year to all Actuary-Info readers!!


Year of Statistics 
2013 will be "The International Year of Statistics("Statistics2013").

Statistics2013 is a worldwide celebration and recognition of the contributions of statistical science.
Through the combined energies of organizations worldwide, Statistics2013 will promote the importance of Statistics.


The goals of Statistics2013 include:
  • increasing public awareness of the power and impact of Statistics on all aspects of society;
  • nurturing Statistics as a profession, especially among young people; and
  • promoting creativity and development in the sciences of Probability and Statistics

Watch the next video:
Improving Human Welfare in 2013 International Year of Statistics

Dec 26, 2012

Inflation or Deflation?

One of the most tricky financial phenomena is INFLATION....

A continuing inflation of an average 2% or 3% devalues pensions and erodes saving accounts on the long run.

A sudden shock of inflation, hyperinflation, vaporizes the assets as well as the debts.

It could be (the only) way out of this sustainable crisis we seem to be dealing with. The other side, credit deflation, is also a potential 'Crisis Solver Candidate' for restructuring the enormous debt in our economy.

Which one will win?  Price (hyper)inflation or credit deflation? That's the key question....

Artificial
Just like the complete arsenal of asset classes in our financial 2012 society, price inflation is not (longer) a result of natural price mechanisms directly or indirectly based on supply and demand.

Worldwide, governments and central banks (FED, ECB, etc) are trying to control inflation  to keep economies as stable as possible and to create an economic environment with growth potential, while restructuring debt step-wise on the long run to 'acceptable' levels....

Historic Price Inflation
With the above formulated insights, let's take a look at how U.S. price inflation and deflation have historically developed on the long run:


A visual analysis of this inflation graph clearly shows the hyperinflation waves (most often) are followed by a hyperdeflation avalanche. However for more than 56 years on a row now, inflation has been only positive. So the key question stays: Are we heading for a major devaluation crash or a final hyperinflation scenario after which what (?) happens????

To get (visual) sight on this question, let's take a look at the 10Y and 50Y moving averages::


At first sight, one could visually conclude that it's most likely that inflation will rise again..... On the other hand, looking 'long term' deflation seems inevitable......   But who really knows?

Detail Figures
Maybe some quantitative information gives more insight:


From this we can conclude that the average arithmetic inflation (1.38%) as well as the compound (geometric) inflation (1.13%) is modest and the standard deviation (considering the low averages) is relatively high.

This calls for a period inspection:

Or in plain numbers:


Now we have a clear view! Until 1900 the average yearly inflation was around 0%. From 1900 to 2000 we suffered from an increasing inflation, mainly due to a number of crises. As from 2000 of, we try to push inflation down, with limited success.

Hyper Risk
All these charts lead to a better view on inflation, but what about the risk of 'hyper' inflation- or deflation.

A short look at the frequency table helps us to get a picture of the inflation risk distribution:

I'll leave it up to you, to draw your conclusions from this last chart.

Mathematica
More insight and feeling about how inflation correlates with some important economic variables can be developed by playing around with the next Mathematica Applet.

To work with the applet, allow the Mathematica plugin to download (it's safe).


This year (2012) inflation come out will be somewhere around 2.1%.

One of my next blogs will allow you to Mathemetica(lly)  'play' with inflation (including the 2012 inflation outcome), so you'll be able to grasp inflation finally.

Finally: Keep Cool!
Until then....., keep cool while watching the inflation balloon rise until it will (not) burst !!! , as researchers in a "Bursting balloons and anxious faces study"  concluded that a person is willingly to take more risk when a watching friend suppresses facial expressions of anxiety. "Such a finding has obvious implications for the interpersonal emotion regulation of advisors or counselors intervening in real world decision making situations". 


Links

Dec 12, 2012

What's your Risk Intelligence Quotient?

One of the main problems in risk management is that we (oblivious) overestimate our risk knowledge.

Example
If for example financial institutional boards have to define a risk-return strategy, they may overestimate the probability that the historic return level of a certain asset class will also be the expected future return level.
Or they might simply overestimate the quality of their investment advisor.... ;-)

To define an optimal asset mix on basis of a risk-return strategy, it takes more than just estimating future returns and/or risks of certain asset classes.

To make these kind of high-impact decisions it's important to train board members on knowledge of economic schools and theories and also on the relationship between economic developments and financial parameters like unemployment, inflation, GDP-growth, specific asset class return and risk parameters, linear and non-linear effects, and so on......

But more than that, it's important that board members - as they have learned all this - become aware of the fact that the more they know about risk and uncertainty, the more they'll realize that the outcome or certainty of a future development is intrinsically highly unsure. This last recognition will have significant consequences for the final choice with regard to the optimal asset mix given the risk appetite.

Risk Intelligence Test 
Eventually it all comes down to
Kowing how much you know
as Dylan Evans, author of the book "Risk Intelligence"states in the Dylan Ratigan Show

According to Dylan : 'Risk intelligence is not about solving probability puzzles; it is about how to make decisions when your knowledge is uncertain.'

Dylan Evans developed a short (5 min) Risk Intelligence Test.
See, if you can pas the test as an actuary or risk manager...
You can take the test here.
The test is also available in Dutch.



Links:
- Homepage Dylan Evans
- Dylan Evans on Twitter
- Dutch Risk Intelligence Test
- Dylan Evans: Emotional Equations (Pdf)

Dec 3, 2012

Solvency II or Basel III ? Model Fallacy

Managing investment models - ALM models in particular - is a professional art. One of the most tricky risk management fallacies when dealing with these models, is that they are being used for identifying so called 'bad scenarios', which are then being 'hedged away'.

To illustrate what is happening, join me in a short every day ALM thought experiment...

Before that, I must warn you... this is going to be a long, technical, but hopefully interesting Blog. I'll try to keep the discussion on 'high school level'. Stay with me, Ill promise: it actuarially pays out in the end!

ALM Thought Experiment
  • Testing the asset Mix
    Suppose the board of our Insurance Company or Pension Fund is testing the current strategic asset mix with help of an ALM model in order to find out more about the future risk characteristics of the chosen portfolio.
     
  • Simulation
    The ALM model runs a 'thousands of scenarios simulation', to find out under which conditions and in which scenarios the 'required return' is met and to test if results are in line with the defined risk appetite.
     
  • Quantum Asset Return Space
    In order to stay as close to reality as possible, let's assume that the 'Quantum Asset Return Space' in which the asset mix has to deliver its required returns for a fixed chosen duration horizon N, consists of: 
    1. 999,900 scenarios with Positive Outcomes ( POs ),
      where the asset returns weigh up to the required return) and 
    2. 100 scenarios with Negative Outcomes ( NOs ),
      where the asset returns fail to weigh up to the required return.
       
    Choose 'N' virtual anywhere between 1 (fraction) of a year up to 50 years, in line with your liability duration.
     

  • Confidence (Base) Rate
    From the above example, we may conclude that the N-year confidence base rate of a positive scenario outcome (in short: assets meet liabilities) in reality is 99.99% and the N-year probability of a company default due to a lack of asset returns in reality is 0.01%.
     
  • From Quantum Space to Reality
    As the strategic asset mix 'performs' in a quantum reality, nobody - no board member or expert - can tell which of the quantum ('potential') scenarios will come true in the next N years or (even) what the exact individual quantum scenarios are.

    Nevertheless, these quantum scenarios all exist in "Quantum Asset Return Space" (QARS) and only one of those quantum scenarios will finally turn out as the one and only 'return reality'.

    Which one...(?), we can only tell after the scenario has manifested itself after N years.
     
  • Defining the ALM Model
    Now we start defining our ALM Model. As any model, our ALM model is an approach of reality (or more specific: the above defined 'quantum reality') in which we are forced to make simplifications, like: defining an 'average return', defining 'risk' as standard deviation, defining a 'normal' or other type of model as basis for drawing 'scenarios' for our ALM's simulation process.
    Therefore our ALM Model is and cannot be perfect.

    Now, because of the fact that our model isn't perfect, let's assume that our 'high quality' ALM Model has an overall Error Rate of 1% (ER=1%), more specific simplified defined as:
    1. The model generates Negative Scenario Outcomes (NSOs) (= required return not met) with an error rate of 1%. In other words: in 1% of the cases, the model generates a positive outcome scenario when it should have generated a negative outcome scenario
       
    2. The model generates Positive Scenario Outcomes (PSOs) (= required return met) with an error rate of 1%. In other words: in 1% of the cases, the model generates a negative outcome scenario when it should have generated a positive outcome scenario
       

The Key Question!
Now that we've set the our ALM model, we run it in a simulation with no matter how much runs. Here is the visual outcome:


As you may notice, the resulting ALM graph tells us more than a billion numbers....At once it's clear that one of the scenarios (the blue one) has a very negative unwanted outcome.
The investment advisor suggests to 'hedge this scenario away'. You as an actuary raise the key question:

What is the probability that a Negative Outcome (NO) scenario in the ALM model is indeed truly a negative outcome and not a false outcome due to the fact that the model is not perfect?

With this question, you hit the nail (right) on the head...
Do you know the answer? Is it 99% exactly, more or less?

Before reading further, try to answer the question and do not cheat by scrolling down.....

To help you prevent reading further by accident, I have inserted a pointful youtube movie:



Answer 
Now here is the answer: The probability that any of the NOs (Negative Outcomes) in the ALM study - and not only the very negative blue one - is a truly a NO and not a PO (Positive Outcome) and therefore false NO, is - fasten your seat belts  - 0.98%! (no misspelling here!)

Warning
So there's a 99.02% (=100%-0.98%) probability that any Negative Outcome from our model is totally wrong, Therefore one must be very cautious and careful with drawing conclusions and formulating risk management actions upon negative scenarios from ALM models in general.

Explanation
Here's the short Excel-like explanation, which is based on Bayes' Theorem.
You can download the Excel spreadsheet here.


There is MORE!
Now you might argue that the low probability (0.98%) of finding true Negative Outcomes is due to the high (99,99%) Positive Outcome rate and that 99,99% is unrealistic much higher than - for instance - the Basel III confidence level of 99,9%. Well..., you're absolutely right. As high positive outcome rates correspond one to one with high confidence levels, here are the results for other positive outcome rates that equal certain well known (future) standard confidence levels (N := 1 year):


What can we conclude from this graph?
If the relative part of positive outcomes and therefore the confidence levels rise, the probability that an identified Negative Output Scenario is true, decreases dramatically fast to zero. To put it in other words:

At high confidence levels (ALM) models can not identify negative scenarios anymore!!!


Higher Error Rates
Now keep in mind we calculated all this still with a high quality error rate of 1%. What about higher model error rates. Here's the outcome:


As expected, at higher error rates, the situation of non detectable negative scenarios gets worse as the model error rate increases......

U.S. Pension Funds
The 50% Confidence Level is added, because a lot of U.S. pension funds are in this confidence area. In this case we find - more or less regardless of the model error rate level - a substantial probability ( 80% - 90%) of finding true negative outcome scenarios. Problem here is, it's useless to define actions on individual negative scenarios. First priority should be to restructure and cut ambition in the current pension agreement, in order to realize a higher confidence level. It's useless to mop the kitchen when your house is flooded with water.....

Model Error Rate Determination
One might argue that the approach in this blog is too theoretical as it's impossible to determine the exact (future) error rate of a model. Yes, it's true that the exact model error rate is hard to determine. However, with help of backtesting the magnitude of the model error rate can be roughly estimated and that's good enough for drawing relevant conclusions.

A General Detectability Equation
The general equation for calculating the Detectability (Rate) of Negative Outcome Scenarios (DNOS) given the model error rate (ER)  and a trusted Confidence Level (CL) is:

DNOS = (1-ER) (1- CL) / ( 1- CL + 2 ER CL -ER )

Example
So a model error rate of 1%, combined with Basel III confidence level of 99.9% results in a low 9.02% [ =(1-0.01)*(1-0.999)/(1-0.999+2*0.01*0.999-0.01) ] detectability of Negative Outcome scenarios.

Detectability Rates
Here's a more complete oversight of detectability rates:


It would take (impossible?) super high quality model error rates of 0.1% or lower to regain detectability power in our (ALM) models, as is shown in the next table:



Required  Model Confidence Level
If we define the Model Confidence Level as MCL = 1 - MER, the rate of Detectability of Negative Outcome Scenarios as DR= Detectability Rate = DNOS and the CL as CL=Positive Outcome Scenarios' Confidence Level, we can calculate an visualize the required  Model Confidence Levels (MCL) as follows:

From this graph it's at a glance clear that already modest Confidence Levels (>90%) in combination with a modest Detectability Rate of 90%, leads to unrealistic required Model Confidence Rates of around 99% or more. Let's not discuss the required Model Confidence Rates for Solvency II and/or Basel II/III.

Conclusions
  1. Current models lose power
    Due to the effect that (ALM) models are limited (model error rates 1%-5%) and confidence levels are increasing (above > 99%) because of more severe regulation, models significantly lose power an therefore become useless in detecting true negative outcome scenarios in a simulation. This implies that models lose their significance with respect to adequate risk management, because it's impossible to detect whether any negative outcome scenario is realistic.
     
  2. Current models not Solvency II and Basel II/III proof
    From (1) we can conclude in general that - despite our sound methods -our models probably are not Solvency II and Basel II/III proof. First action to take, is to get sight on the error rate of our models in high confidence environments...
     
  3. New models?
    The alternative and challenge for actuaries and investment modelers is to develop new models with substantial lower model error rates (< 0.1%).

    Key Question: Is that possible?

    If you are inclined to think it is, please keep in mind that human beings have an error rate of 1% and computer programs have an error rate of about 3%.......
     

Links & Sources:

Nov 24, 2012

Dying Age Quiz

Ever heard of Club 27? It turns out that famous pop artists have a preferred age of dying: 27.

Among this 'club', with around 50 unlucky 'members' that all died at the age of 27, are well known names like Brian Jones, Jimi Hendrix, Janis Joplin, Jim Morrison and (lately, 2011) Amy Winehouse.

There's been a lot of (actuarial) discussion whether this club 27 phenomenon is a mortality anomaly or not.

In a statistical study from BMJ (British Journal of Medicine) called "Is 27 really a dangerous age for famous musicians? Retrospective cohort study", it's shown that  there's no peak in the risk of death for famous musicians at age 27.


Club 27, or its movie,  is therefore a nice opportunity to study some interesting artists who died young, but not based on any statistical relevance.

Quiz
Not only some top musicians died young, but also some 'historical' celebrities.

Now take the next quiz to test your knowledge on the dying age of the next famous people who changed the world, each on in his/her own way:





Links and sources:
- BMJ Statistical Study
- Dying Age Quiz of Famous People
Death, Actuarial Science and Rock n’ Roll-the 27 Club