Actuarial Fallacies

Just some light stuff, to chew the cud during holidays...

A good friend tells you that a certain 'John Nevermet' is an introverted professional and is either an actuary or a salesman.

Which one do you think John most probably is?

If your first thought was: an actuary, congratulations(!), you just got caught in what is called a classical

Thinking Trap

Most people - not actuaries of course ;-) - are tempted to think John is almost certainly an actuary.On the other hand, they think of a salesman as 'outgoing', 'extrovert' or maybe 'pushy', but certainly not as 'introvert'. Wrapped up : John is an actuary....

Sorry, but - as you know - this logic conclusion is definitely wrong. It neglects the fact that salesmen outnumber actuaries at most 100 to 1. Before you would even start to consider John's character, you should have concluded that even when all the actuaries were introvert, there would only be a small 1% probability that John is actually an actuary (only in the unlikely case that less than 1% of the salesmen would be introvert, this option would be logically to consider).

Top 10 Thinking Traps
This foregoing simple example is just one of the fabulous Top 10 Thinking Traps Exposed by Luciano Passuello.

On his blog Litemind, Luciano explains in a 5 minute 'must read' called 'How to Foolproof Your Mind' the next interesting and most harmful Thinking Traps, including suggestions on how to avoid each one of them. :

1. Anchoring Trap: Over-Relying on First Thoughts
   Your starting point can heavily bias your thinking
   
2. Status Quo Trap: Keeping on Keeping On
   We tend to repeat established behaviors
   
3. Sunk Cost Trap: Protecting Earlier Choices
   Sunk cost shouldn’t influence a decision, but it does
   
4. Confirmation Trap: Seeing What You Want to See
   Being less critical of arguments that support our initial ideas
5. Incomplete Information Trap: Review Your Assumptions
   Overlooking a simple data element can mislead our intuition
   
6. Conformity Trap: Everybody Else Is Doing It
   Other people’s actions do heavily influence ours
   
7. Illusion of Control Trap: Shooting in the Dark
   The tendency to overestimate our personal control
8. Coincidence Trap: We Suck at Probabilities
   A “miracle” is - given enough attempts - possible!
   
9. Recall Trap: Not All Memories Are Created Equal
   “Special events” have the potential to distort our thinking
   
10. Superiority Trap: The Average is Above Average
    People have much inflated views of themselves
    

Thinking traps are a special form of fallacies.

Example
A nice and triggering example of a composition fallacy is:
I fit into my shirt... My shirt fits into my luggage...
Therefore I fit in my luggage...

Can you tell what's going wrong here?
Yes? Then get ready for the next fallacy phase.

Although there a complete list of fallacies, another new interesting subset could be defined as 'Actuarial Fallacies'....

Actuarial Fallacies
Except for a 1988 homonymous, humorous intended, nevertheless still actual and relevant document by Charles L. McClenahan, nothing much has been published on actuarial fallacies.

Apparently fallacies are not an issue on the Actuarial Globe.

Therefore, I'll confine my remarks to a few actuarial events, of which each one could easily be nominated for the fictional 'Grand Actuarial Fallacy Prize':

1. Longevity risk can be easily managed
   Longevity slowly but steadily increases. It's not a yearly smashing or impressing risk, but over the years it has the characteristics of a killing sniper: when you finally discover the accumulated longevity loss after a few years, it's almost too late to handle and take appropriate measures.
   
   Actuaries could have foreseen a few decades ago that the average life span would keep rising and adequate measures had to be taken at once. Instead, actuaries failed to catch the implications of the rise in longevity and were caught by the proverbial 'boiling frog effect'. In short: actuaries failed to act in time....
   
   
2. Stocks are a hedge against fixed-income liabilities
   Already in 1994 in a document called 'On The Risk of Stocks in the Long Run', nobody else than Zvi Bodie already proved that stocks are not a hedge against fixed-income liabilities even in the long run.
   
   
3. Credit Crisis
   Actuaries have failed in foreseeing the credit crisis. We have greatly underestimated the developments and put our head in the sand. We have trusted business plans promising ROEs of 15% and more.Read more in Actuary-Info's : "Wir haben es nicht gewußt!"
   
   
4. VAR Model
   As an article in The Actuary shows, we got intimidated and overruled by the 'magic' quants with their Value at Risk (VaR) models. We did and do know better as actuaries, but missed the boat. Actuaries should be more than professionally trained in giving 'push back'.
   
   
5. The relationship between risk and return
   As we know this risk-return relationship is central to strategy research and practice.
   
   In measuring risk as the variance of a series of accounting-based returns, Bowman obtained the puzzling result of a negative association between risk and mean return.The expected positive association between risk and return turns out to be elusive.
   
   Henkel explains in two must-read articles 'Risk-Return Fallacy' (2000) and The Risk-Return Paradox for Strategic Management: Disentangling True and Spurious Effects the problems and solutions in this field.
   
   Instead of only following what's happening on the other side of the balance sheet, actuaries should mobilize themselves and add some new insights!
   
   Asset Actuaries, please rise!
   
   
   Es ist nicht genug zu wissen, man muss auch anwenden
   - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe -
   
   

Now that we've unmasked several fallacies, in special the 'introvert actuary fallacy', let's conclude our fallacy course with a 'lessons learned?' actuarial anecdote:

Why it's better to work with an imperfect actuary
We all know: A perfect actuary draws perfect conclusions form perfect datasets.

Then of course : A perfect actuary certainly draws "wrong conclusions" from imperfect data.

It's a fact that the data are always imperfect.

So that we can conclude that there is at least a small chance that an imperfect actuary may draw the right conclusion.


That's why it's better to work with an imperfect actuary.

Client Quote
As we know, clients are always right. Remarkably, the next client quote seems to stress the mentioned successful outcome of the imperfect actuary:
I once had an actuary tell me that, because the future is uncertain, his numbers were almost certainly wrong, but he believed they were less wrong than guessing outcomes with no analysis.

You think - by now - you know everything about fallacies?
Well, test it by taking the next fallacy Quiz:

How logical are you?

Success!

Original source :
The November 1983 Random Sampler article Actuarial Fallacies

Hypegiaphobia

What's that spell? Hypegiaphobia?

Yes, Hypegiaphobia is the unpronounceable 'short' for:

A fear of responsibility

In a 2008 white paper, called Hypegiaphobia, KPMG stresses the importance that organizations want to be and must be 'in control' of a multitude of risks and therefore make enormous sacrifices to achieve this goal.

CEO, management and employees have to comply to so many simultaneous goals, and the consequences of not being compliant on a single issue are that high, that people fear to take individual responsibility in a organization.

In search of the balance between rules and trust, KPMG calls upon the parties involved to provide more space for individual responsibilities. In the mentioned white paper KPMG answers two key questions:

• Are the high investments in risk management effective and do they really lead to a lower risk profile?
  
  
• Does risk management overshoot its goal and produce undesirable effects, such as reduced entrepreneurial spirit, increasing litigation, a culture of fear and a potentially adverse effect on the competitive position?

Trust Rules
Moreover, in 2009 KPMG extended their view on Hypegiaphobia by publishing a document called 'Trust Rules'.

Guts, vision and trust go hand in hand in a time of increasing litigation.

Unplug
Lately, numerous persons and organizations in the Netherlands have had the guts to “unplug”. Unplug is a new work style by which numerous (compliance) issues are handled in unconventional ways :

• Getting rid of unnecessary rules, of fixed places and times
• Dealing better with knowledge
• Collaborating more
• Taking more personal responsibility

All this with a a single focus: The client.

Principles
To organize trust and to be able to trust, KPMG has formulated (on basis of client interviews) nine principles they call trust rules (mark: the noun has turned into a verb) :

1. Make contact personal
2. Define common goals
3. Set the right example
4. Build trust with sensible rules
5. Share responsibility and trust
6. Stay on course and keep calm, even when things go wrong
7. Rely on informed trust, not on blind trust
8. Be mild on misunderstanding but crush abuse
9. Dare to experiment and learn from experience

Risk
In a document called Signs of Safety, risk is defined as an increasingly defining motif of the social life of western countries.

However, risk is almost always seen as negative, as something that must be avoided.

Killing Black Swans
To put it simply: everyone is worried about been blamed and sued for something. Thus organizations have become increasingly risk-averse to the point of risk-phobia. Elimination of every Black Swan risk at any price, seems the unrealistic and never ending target.

New solutions
The challenge for management, actuaries and accountants is to see and define Risk in terms of a potential big win and investment instead of only a potential big loss. This also means that - as a society - we have to reformulate rules and laws in a way that risks can be taken in such a way that failure, bankruptcy are or catastrophes are not (nearly) completely excluded anymore.

Often economies of scale lead to the rise of international (financial) companies that overshadow individual countries in terms of VAR.
If country governments of such 'inhabited' international enterprises are convinced that an eventual bankruptcy of such a company would create great collateral damage and therefore is not an realistic option, things will have to change. In these cases governments have no other choice than to order by law:

• a limitation of (international) company size
• a limitation of reciprocal contracts between big companies
  

or...

• to demand and allow companies to restructure themselves in such a way that, in case of a catastrophe, only a part of the company goes bankrupt and not the company as a whole
  

In these cases state (re)insurance is not a preferable solution. Pricing this risk would be too expensive or - even worse - not charging for this risk would lead to a situation where management can take every risk they want, because in case of a bankruptcy, the government would back up anyhow.

Risk-Phobia Virus
As actuaries we're extremely vulnerable to the 'risk-phobia virus'.
Let's not get caught by this virus or hide in the bush, but take a calculated risk and go out to present our new solutions that make the difference in tomorrows risky world. Risk..., a never ending issue....

Links: Hypegiaphobia Video , List of phobia's, Dutch nine trust rules
Sources: Signs of Safety

Actuary Core Qualities

Apart from an official outstanding actuarial education, what core qualities does an actuary need to be successful?

Summarized, here are some of the main qualities:

• Great Mathematical skills and experience
• Outstanding multi level, oral and written communication skills
• Interpersonal and social skills
• Being able to downgrade complex problems to simple decisions to be taken
• Self-motivated, ambitious, creative, independent, team worker
• Conflict solving capabilities; Empathic but also decisive
• Professional integrity, commercial outlook
• A professional discussion partner for professionals in other areas as Pension, Investment, Health, Risk, Governance, ICT, Finance, Administration, Marketing, HR, Legal & Fiscal affairs, etc.

To put is simply: an actuary has to be a kind of 'White Raven', a 'one in a million professional'.....

However, actuaries are just like humans, they do not only have their core qualities, but also their pitfalls.

Besides, how can you find out what your core quality is?

Core Quality Test
Well, the simple answer is that -thanks to Daniel Ofman - you can find out in a one minute online test what your core quality is.

This test doesn't only defines your core quality, but also your pitfall, challenge and allergy.

TAKE THE CORE QUALITY TEST

Now you know what your qualities and pitfalls are, you may as well start working on them!

Links: Core-Qualities
Sources : Wiki, RSS,

Swine Flu Counter update 06-07-2009

Want a simple global Swine Flu Counter on your web page?

You may find the old (July 6, 2009) Counter/Calculator Here.
There is already a new counter on a more recent model available.
Look at : Swine Flu Counter Update-sept-2009

The (old) counter is based on a 'July 6, 2009 estimation' as described on Actuary-Info. However, now the data have been updated based on the official, more reliable and accurate WHO reports.



If necessary, counters will be updated again on a on a regular basis. The latest data you'll find in this XLS spreadsheet.

Install Swine Flu Counter
How to implement this old Swine Flu Counter on your web site?

• Put the next HTML-script (without the outer quotes) just before the end of the body tag:' <script language="javascript" type="text/javascript" src="http://jos.blogspot.googlepages.com/swine-flu-2009.js"> </script>'
  


• Put the next HTML-line (without the outer quotes) where you want the Swine Flu table to appear on your site :
  ' <div id="swineflutable"></div> '
  
  
• Ready!

Remember, you may only install one counter on your website, either the old or the new.

Paradox
The best what could and will happen with regard to the original swine flu model and corresponding counter, is that they don't turn out to be valid. This way the model and counter will have proven their 'reason for existence'. Simply just by contributing to the necessary awareness and prevention measures to diminish or stop the exponential swine flu infections growth.

Contrary, developing but not publishing models or counters will create a lack of warning and attention and would therefore prove the (exponential) model to become true. This is the inevitable paradox of modeling with our without follow up actions.

This paradox is the main reason why an 'actuarial advice' should therefore alway be presented in a (minimal) "two-way scenario" form:

• Estimation of results without follow up actions
• Estimation of results including advised follow up actions

Anyway, have fun with your Swine Flu Counter!

Joshua Maggid

ADD July 18, 2009
On July 16, 2009 WHO reports:

• Further spread of the pandemic, within affected countries and to new countries, is considered inevitable.
• This assumption is fully backed by experience. The 2009 influenza pandemic has spread internationally with unprecedented speed. In past pandemics, influenza viruses have needed more than six months to spread as widely as the new H1N1 virus has spread in less than six weeks.
• The increasing number of cases in many countries with sustained community transmission is making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for countries to try and confirm them through laboratory testing. Moreover, the counting of individual cases is now no longer essential in such countries for monitoring either the level or nature of the risk posed by the pandemic virus or to guide implementation of the most appropriate response measures.

In short: now h1n1 really gets important and probably is running out of hand, WHO stops reporting.....
Let's see if we can find another source....

ADD July 21, 2009
Wikipedia's 2009 flu pandemic reports (based on ECDC reports, as WHO reports fail) an accumulated number of 143,652 reported infections and 899 deaths on July 21, 2009. As the WHO has decided not to registrate the number of infections anymore (as from july 9) and, except for the US, reports are based on confirmed laboratory test results, the actual number of infections will be much higher.

That's why, as long as the actual deaths are in line with the modelled estimated death, the 'July 6th exponential model', used as basis for the swine flu counter, seems still realistic and valid!

ADD Sept 06, 2009
The data have structurally changed from exponential to linear.
Take a look at the new counter at:

Swine Flu Counter Update-sept-2009

H1N1 Swine Flu Projection

Strange... a lot of (WHO) swine flu talk and information on the Internet, but no worldwide projections or estimates....

The risk of underestimating the so called H1N1 (Swine Flu) virus is not unthinkable.

Worldwide Projection H1N1 Virus
You don't have to be an actuary or mathematician to make a sound projection of the number of people that will be infected (or die) within the next months. All it takes is 'basic high school' and a common spreadsheet.

Let's make a simple worldwide projection of the expected cases (infections) based upon the WolframAlpha data-set:



The purple line illustrates the development of the number of infections worldwide, the dotted purple line illustrates the expected projected development until the end of july 2009.

With one view it's clear is that during the next months the H1N1 virus spread will be enormous. By the end of July 2009 the number of worldwide infections will rise to almost 0.5 million. The spread of the virus will probably be enforced by the fact that a lot of people have their holidays and therefore travel by plane or bus.

As one would aspect, the development of the number of infections is exponential. The (natural) logarithm of the expected cases (dashed red line) is almost a linear curve. You may find more information of data and projections in the next XLS spreadsheet.

Big Explosion
If no additional prevention actions will be taken, a big explosion of the virus starts just after the holiday period in 2009.



It is questionable if the planned vaccinations for October or later will be in time.Perhaps it's better to have a vaccination, or take Tamiflu, than a vacation in July or August.

Global Infection
If no adequate rigid measures will be taken within the next months, the future of humanity could be serious at stake:



Unrestrained exponential growth on basis of the the current growth-path, will lead to a more or less complete global infection by the end of January 2010.

By then ruffly 36 million people worldwide, will have died. If the mortality rate doesn't stabilize (as it currently appears) at 0.45% of the infected people, the effects could be worse.

As the famous 'Wheat and chessboard problem' already illustrated, exponential growth is a dangerous underestimated killer. It's just like a tsunami: when you notice it, it's too late to act.

Let's trust governments are not underestimating this Swine virus threat.

Happy holidays!

Related Links:
- World Population Density
- U.S. Death rates influenza virus 1918
- Visual Flu Tracker
- LinkedIn: InArm: Important remarks by Dave Ingram

Important Notice

• The 'July 2009 estimation', based on new more reliable and accurate WHO data, you may find on Swine Flu Counter.
  
  
• You'll find the latest (Sept 6, 2009) estimation and Swine Flu Counter on Swine Flu Counter Update-sept-2009

Central Bank Risk Management

Facing 2009, leads us back 300 years in history, when funding 'credit demand' was one of the main reasons for founding Central Banks in England (1694), the USA (1790) and the Netherlands (1814).

Let's go back in history and have a short look at the situation in the Netherlands 200 years ago...

More history DNB
English, Dutch

Monetary Stability

Nowadays the importance of monetary stability is just as important as a few eras ago. It cannot be underestimated.

The years of the gold standard are behind us. Question is: are there any stable new alternatives?

Learning from the past, one way or the other, we will have to introduce new trustful standards. Maintaining the current situation will probably not lead to a sustainable financial system on the long term.

To stress the importance of a stable standard, just take a look at the development of the next Federal Reserve Balance Sheet:


The above graph clearly shows that Central Bank Risk Management is not an unimportant issue....

Fed Example
Example: As more 'bad loans' and up on the U.S. federal balance sheet, to prohibit downgrade U.S. credit rating , the FED - one way or the other - will have to standardize itself.

Central Banks are monitoring themselves
The past has shown that self-regulation in private financial markets doesn't work. Be confident, it won't work on a Central Bank level either: balance size figures and federal stakeholder interests have grown to enormous proportions.

Central Banks are in fact regulating and monitoring themselves and - except for the Eurosystem - they don't fully comply to international accounting standards as well, a risk society clearly cannot permit itself.

Split up Central Banks
To regain control of central banks, governments will have to split their Central Banks into:

• A regular "Reserve Bank" (monetary function) and a
• An objective independent Regulator, that regulates private banks as well as the State Bank.

If a Central Bank is also operating as a State Bank, this Bank should also be separated from the Reserve Bank business, to guaranty an objective monetary policy by the Reserve Bank in a specific country.

In the mean time, Central Banks will have to become innovative and come up with a collectively supported new standard alternative. They have to act fast, before the market creates his own new wild and probably risky standards out the financial market chaos.

Actuaries and Economists could work together to develop such a stable risk-free standard.

Pension Fund Death Spiral

In a very simplified model (Pensions Dynamics, PPT), professor of investment strategy, Alan White, concludes that defined benefit pension plans probably cannot succeed on the long term.

Death Spiral
White shows that every pension fund with a non risk-free asset approach, will eventually encounter a “Death Spiral” which will lead to the collapse of the fund. The only solutions are:

• Raising contribution rates
• Lowering promised pension benefits.

Assumptions
All conclusions are based on the next summarized main assumptions:

• Compensation growth: 2% per year
• Pension contribution: 15% of yearly compensation
• Yearly retirement income objective: 70% of his final salary
• Risk-free rate of interest is 3%;Risk premium on the risky assets: 3%
• Annual volatility of the risky assets: 15%
• Time horizon: 100-year
• Risky Assets investment part : 60% of the portfolio
• Corresponding final pay pension defined as 20 year annuity
• Required minimum average Pension Fund asset value in steady state
  - at 3% return: €/$ 47,200
  - at 6% return: €/$ 23,600

Frequency Distribution Outcome
One of the most striking outcomes of this study is the fact that as we look farther in to the future of the simulated pension fund, the amplitude of the frequency distribution of asset values appears to be dropping to zero. The chance that (average) asset values will be between $10,000 and $100,000 gets smaller and smaller.

The reason for this is that the probability of very high asset values and the probability of entering a collapsed state (the collapsed funds are not shown in the next figure) both increase as we expand out time horizon. As a result the probability that assets remain in the intermediate interval, is reduced.

Another interesting facts are:

• Asset values appear to become more sustainable as the part 'risky assets' increases
• Collapse rates for growing pension funds are, (almost) independently of the asset mix, negligible.
• Collapse rates for more mature (steady state) pension funds are substantial and increase to deadly percentages as the time horizon increases from 50 to 100 years.

Remarks
Although Whites model is perhaps oversimplified and can be easily criticized, it clearly shows the essential principles of running a pension fund.

In a commentary, Rob Bauer (ABP, University of Maastricht) argues White's conclusions. Nevertheless, interesting stuff, that stimulates actuarial insight.

Links
Interesting corresponding links:

• Longer Horizons Can Handle Riskier Holdings
• Stochastic Interest rate models (2008)
• The calculus of retirement income

Influenced Decisions

As sincere actuaries, we all think our decisions are made in a pure professional and rational manner. Upon our turn, the board we advise, takes decisions based on our 'objective' unbiased advices.

Too bad, nothing is less is true! Decisions are strongly influenced by the way we present our proposals.


Influenced Decisions
In a splendid TED Video Presentation called 'Are we in control of our own decisions' (half an our fun and learning!) , Dan Ariely, an Israeli professor of behavioral economics and head of the eRationality research group at the MIT Media Lab, shows the astonishing effect of how decisions can be fundamentally changed by adding dummies in proposals:

First experiment
Ariely tested the next ad on the website of the Economist.com on a group of 100 MIT students:

As expected, most students wanted the combo deal (84%). Students can read, so nobody wanted the middle option.

But now, if you have an option nobody wants, you can take it off. Right? So Ariely tested another version of this ad on another group of students, eliminating the middle option. This is what happened:

Now the most popular option (84%) suddenly became the least popular (32%). And the least popular (16%) became the most popular (68%) option.

What happened was that the 'useless' option in the middle, was useless in the sense that nobody wanted it. But it wasn't useless in the sense that it helped people figure out what they wanted. In fact, relative to the option in the middle, which was get only the print for $125, the print and web for $125 looked like a fantastic deal. And as a consequence, people chose it.

The general idea here is that we actually don't know our preferences that well. And because we don't know our preferences that well we're susceptible to all of these influences from the external forces.

Second experiment
People believe that when they see somebody, they immediately know whether they like that person or not. Ariely decided to put this statement to the test.

He showed his students a picture of Tom and a picture of Jerry (real people in practice). Then he asked "Who do you want to date? Tom or Jerry?" But for half the people he added a slightly less attractive (photoshopped) version of Jerry. For the other half of the students he added a slightly less attractive (ugly) version of Tom.

Now the question was, will ugly Jerry and ugly Tom help their respective, more attractive brothers?

The answer was absolutely YES. When ugly Jerry was around, Jerry was popular. When ugly Tom was around, Tom was popular.


Conclusions: The Dummy Effect
What can we conclude from these two experiments?

When a board has to take a decision between two main proposals, their decision might be positively influenced by adding a third 'slightly less attractive version' (the dummy) of the proposal you - as an actuary - value as most favorable.

The danger that you - unaware of this dummy-effect - add slightly other proposals is substantial, as - in searching for the best decision - you'll be naturally inclined to add a few solutions nearby the optimal solution.

From now on...
Now that you've become aware of this dummy-effect, your next board proposals will be 'cleaner' than before and 'undummied'. Also you'll have a more enriched look at third party (or employee) proposals that are on your or on your boards table. From now on your board advise will not only focus on the technical or actuarial matters, but also include a professional opinion about the way a proposal is structured and presented.

Good luck in developing proposals.....

Links
- Book Predictably Irrational by Dan Ariely
- MIT Center for future banking

Happy Life Expectancy

As we know, Life Expectation can be measured in many ways. The three most common methods are:

• LE = Life Expectation (standard), the average number of years that a newborn can expect to live.
• HALE = Health Adjusted Life Expectation, the average number of years that a newborn can expect to live in "full health"
• HLE = Healthy Life Expectation, the average number of years that a newborn can expect to live in "full perceived health"

As comparisons between LE an HALE show, 'living longer' doesn't necessarily mean 'living longer in good health'. However, it has become clear that a strong Healthy Working Life Expectancy at age 50 or higher is the best guarantee that people will be able to work longer as they live longer.

One step further. Living in "good (perceived) health" doesn't automatically mean that people are living a happy life.

Happiness is one of the most important lifestyle statistics. Optimizing the number of 'happy years' in our life is therefore an important issue.

Happy Life Expectancy
Here is where Prof.dr. Ruut Veenhoven (Publications), comes in.

Veenhoven defines a different HLE as:

Happy Life Expectancy

In formula:

HLE = LE x Happiness-score/10

The Happiness-score (H) is the average happiness as expressed on a 0-10 scale.

Let's compare the HALE an HLE (Happy Life Expectancy) scores with each other for different (top-30 ranked) countries:

A full list and data is available at the World Database of Happiness.

It's clear that in most top-30 countries we spend about 90% of our life in healthy conditions and only about 70-80% in happy conditions. There room for improvement here! I'll leave the other conclusions up to yourself....

Let's conclude with two other correlated interesting findings:

1. Happy Life Expectancy Determination
What public policies are most conducive to happiness? This requires a view on the determinants of happiness in nations:

It turns out that six societal qualities (wealth, security, freedom, inequality, brotherhood and justice) explain 83% of the differences in Average happiness, 71% of the differences in Inequality of happiness and no less than 87% of the differences in Happy Life Years.
Enough for an interesting discussion between actuaries and politicians, I would say....

2. Wealth and happiness correlation
As expected wealth (expressed in GDP per capita) and happiness (e.g. highly satisfaction) are strongly correlated in clear distinguished regions.
Also the 'mean life satisfaction' turns out to be correlated to different age-groups and countries:


These graphics are food for thought on the relationship between mortality and wealth. More about that soon......

Paradox of Cautiousness

Actuary, Accountant, Supervisor or Consultant, life is full of paradoxes....

Let's examine a very interesting statement made by the respected President of the Dutch Supervisor DNB, Dr. A.H.E.M. Wellink, in a recent interview on Dutch television (2009;Pauw & Witteman, in Dutch):

"If the (economic) growth fall is between minus 1 and minus 2, and I think it is minus 2, I would express myself in a very subtle and nuanced way, by saying:
"I think it's closer to minus 2 than minus 1". And then, if you listen well, you would know it's actually minus 2.
To be sure, we - me and my (supervisory) colleagues - say it in a more cautious way ..."

What can we conclude from this short prodigious statement?

Communication fuzz
What first becomes clear in this statement is that responsible board members of (local) supervisors, due to media attention and unrealistic expectations, are forced to communicate in euphemisms or coded idiom.

As a consequence, professionals as well as the public, can only have a best guess at what the real message could be, with communication fuzz as a result.

President Wellink should be allowed to simply state that what he actually means, in this case:
"I think the economic growth will be around minus 2 percent".

Diferent meaning
Second problem with trying to communicate in a 'cautious' way, is that the word 'cautious' has a different meaning for different stakeholders.

For example: an investment will have a different risk profile for the investor, the asset management company, the company's shareholder or the supervisor. Each of these stakeholders will therefore have their own definition of the word 'cautious'.

As a consequence, last but not least, it is the question whether it's 'cautious' if you state the negative growth higher (less negative) than what you really think it is. Most people in the public domain will probably qualify this statement as incautious.

Paradox
Life of supervisory board members is not easy. They are confronted with a persistent paradox, the Paradox of Cautiousness.

If board members report 'early warnings' they are treated as 'messengers of bad news', accused of market interference or irresponsible actions and launching self fulfilling prophecies. On top of this they may get fired or even be held responsible for the negative financial impact of their statements.

On the other hand, if they don't report their findings public and try to solve the problems in a diplomatic way behind close doors, they may get accused afterwards for not having warned in an earlier phase.

Life is full of risks, not only financial risks, but also the risk of the consequences of (non) communication.

Actuaries
As actuaries, we're often in the same difficult situation as President Wellink. We also have to act cautious, realize our 'cautious' advise regarding the Pension Fund, could implicate an 'incautious' advice for the sponsor or the participants of the pension fund.

Not only actuaries, but also accountants, investors or - in short - everyone who has an advisory or controlling function, have to deal with this 'Paradox of Cautiousness'.


Risk Escalation Management & POP
In most cases the Paradox of Cautiousness can be avoided by proactive Risk management.

If (recalculation of) your Risk Management Models or Scenario's indicate a significant change of risk in the (near) future, immediately take action, propose measures and demand adequate decisions. Don't postpone your actions in order to be sure of the observed changes nor on the advice of friendly 'experienced' stakeholders that tell you with a smile there'll be no problem at all and you're overreacting.

Once you're in the phase where incidentally ad-hoc repair management by the board has failed and serious structural repair management scenario's have to be put on the table, you're too late!

You'll have past the so called point of no return - in this case - the Point of Paradox (POP), you're caught in

The Paradox of Cautiousness

If you put your warnings and proposals in this phase on the table, stakeholders will tell you they felt caught by your actions. Soon board members and other stakeholders will blame you for not having warned them earlier and will question your accountability. Before you realize what's going on, you're in phase three: Crisis management, your head is on the block.

Rules of Thumb
From Wellink's simple example, we may conclude several rules of thumb about being cautious:

• Dimension cautioness
  Never state that you are cautious in general, always dimension cautiousness with regard to the different stakeholders and the type and size of risks.
  
  
• Early stage warning
  In line with "good governance" always try to warn in an early stage, before the Point of Paradox (POP) when things are (about) to move in the wrong direction, but are still manageable. Warn in a transparent way, open and visible to all stakeholders. Arrange a board level discussion and make sure you've got a completely free hand in what and how you put your findings and vision on the table.
  
  
• External Advice
  Make sure that you're allowed (and have budget) to hire external consult whenever you think this is necessary. In case of discussions or decisions that may have substantial financial impact, don't doubt, but hire external legal or financial consult to assist you and to validate your findings.
  
  
• Contract & Access
  Make sure your contract includes conditions that prevent your employer from firing you during your report findings period and make sure you have (formal) access to any (supervisory) board member when you think this is opportune.

After this heavy stuff, let's conclude with a nice parable...

Parable of the Cautious Actuary
There was a very cautious actuary,
who never laughed or cried.
He never risked, he never lost,
he never won nor tried.
And when he one day passed away,
his insurance was denied,
For since he never really lived,
they claimed he never died.
- Unknown -

WolframAlpha Actuary Wages

The new search engine WolframAlpha, is really a big hit for actuaries and mathematicians. Just fill in a formula like x^2 sin(x) and enjoy what WolframAlpha makes of it....

Some typical handy features for actuaries and other finance whizkids are available.
Just click on the next links to see what WolframAlpha makes of the word:

• AEGON , General Motors
• continuous interest PV=$3800, rate=6%, periods=5
• derivative of x^4 sin x

Click this video to learn more about the use of WolframAlpha.

Let's conclude with an interesting example. Here's what WolframAlpha makes of the word "actuary":

Computed by Wolfram Mathematica

Actuary Thyl Ulenspiegel?

Anyone with a little mother wit knows one plus one equals exactly two, not more, not less.

Smart people, like the historic Thyl Ulenspiegel, made a profession out of counting. Every time bystanders gave Thyl the choice between a rix-dollar (a 'two and a half dollar' coin) or 2 dollars coins, he opted for the 2 dollars.

"Two is more than one", Thyl - clearly not an actuary - used to say. People felt pity for 'poor Thyl Ulenspiegel'. That someone like him could be that stupid!


Modern Counting
Today (2009) little has changed. Modern gurus made us believe that, through M&A's, synergy, cooperation, in or outsourcing, the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts. One plus one could easily equal three or even more.

However, research has shown that the majority of mergers and acquisitions fail. Hindsight shows that one plus one doesn't add up to three, but only to one point five, or in some cases even to zero. Cause? Synergy benefits and future market are extremely overestimated and cultural differences, despite continued 'slippery warnings', remain underestimated.

Shareholders and management of an acquired company cash their future notional profit surplus, that -at first - appears in the balance sheet as 'goodwill' and than subsequently, over the years, becomes visible as a loss in the P&L.

However there are other modern counters - not actuaries - that can even do better, as will be illustrated next.

Some youth memories never fade..
As a young boy I discovered an unstamped stamp in the attic of our house.

The stamp was worth 50 billion Deutsche Mark, dated 1923.

Completely overwhelmed I tumbled down the stairs to report my parents we'd become billionaires.

A few minutes later, completely disillusioned, I'd learned a new word: Hyperinflation.


Hyperinflation
The hyperinflation back in the twenties of the the last century is only a trifle of the current (hyper) credit inflation:

U.S. $ 1.000.000.000.000

A trillion dollars, the Fed 'invests' in buying up debt. By coincidence this equals the amount of money that Europe, the G20, will be pumping in the economy.

For all of 2009, the U.S. administration probably needs to borrow about $2 trillion. That money doesn't really exist, but that's no point of concern! The debt crisis is simply solved with more debt. What was not legitimate for the banks, is now legitimate for the 'bankruptcy proof government'. Frankly, my intuition really starts to falter now ...

Russian Credit Roulette
Modern Ulenspiegels, playing a variant of 'Russian Credit Roulette', have now left the roulette tables. With borrowed money, doubling their bet for five consecutive times in a row, they bet and lost on 'credit red'.

Instead of taking their loss, the government has taken their place at the table and decided to double the bet on red for the sixth time in a row, now playing for a trillion dollars.

All of this under enhanced risk management, governance and supervision of course.

To get a really confident feeling: the probability of consecutive six times black seems both rational and intuitive almost impossible, but is in any case less than the "safe" smaller 2.5% ruin probability (2.5% probability of insolvency) of a pension fund. Some people state there's light at the end of the 'financial crisis' tunnel.

Now let's hope this light is no oncoming train and roulette tables turn out to have a memory after all.

Maybe it's time actuaries get involved in government finance....

Live Piracy Map

According to IMB Piracy attacks almost doubled in 2009 first quarter.

Pirating in the Gulf of Aden, transit way for a third of the world's commerce, set a record of 120 attacks in 2008. Estimates of ransom payments vary and are estimated at around $40 million last year.

Attacks, and ransoms, in 2009 are on a pace to top those records. In his column "Insurance companies' piracy policies can be a double-edged sword", David Greising -business columnist for the Chicago Tribune - states:

• In the business world, risks create opportunities, so you shouldn't be surprised to know that the scourge of piracy on the high seas has led to a nifty innovation: pirate insurance.
• Chicago-based Aon Corp. and other companies have begun offering policies to guard against the loss of ships, cargo or crews to pirates.
• If shippers become more willing to make ransom payments because they'll have insurance to cover losses, it may only add to the economic booty that tempts Somalis into piracy in the first place.
• One of the lasting lessons of the piracy epidemic is how some of the world's most powerful naval forces have been almost powerless against speedboat-driving outlaws from one of the world's broken-down states. It will be tough to solve the piracy problem so long as anarchy and economic deprivation persist in Somalia.

Nevertheless piracy insurance business is high profitable for companies like AON. So profitable that according to Workers World there are some pirates who don’t use firearms to seize vessels on the high seas.

Some even go further than that


IMB
The ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the International Chamber Of Commerce (ICC). The IMB is a non-profit making organisation to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. IMB’s main task is to protect the integrity of international trade by seeking out fraud and malpractice.

IMB Live Piracy Map 2009
This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2009.

=

Actual Attack

=

Attempted Attack

=

Suspicious vessel

Sources: International Maritime Bureau,
Live Piracy Report, Piracy Map 2008, Piracy Map 2007

Any comment on where to find more information about the actuarial modeling of pirate risks (Kidnap and ransom insurance) and/or insurance quoting would be welcome.

Chinese Actuary - Computer - Crisis

One of the interesting aspects of the Chinese language is that words are like little pictures, pictograms or logographs, the so called 'characters'. Moreover, some words are a combination, or (better) a superposition, of several of those characters.

So the meaning of a Chinese word can be deducted by interpretation of the pictograms and relating them. And, as the saying is "A picture is worth a thousand words", you don't need to be an actuary to calculate the enormous expression-power of the Chinese language. Every word is like a book of words and expresses not only the rational meaning but also the embodied feeling (mood) that goes along with the the formal meaning.

The power of the Chinese language can be illustrated by three simple examples, the Chinese words for Actuary, Computer and Crisis:

1. Actuary
The Chinese word for Actuary is :精算师

Pronunciation: jing suan shyr

The Chinese word Actuary consists of three characters:

1. Jing, 精, means Skilled or Elite
2. Suàn, 算, means 'to calculate' or 'to count'
3. Shyr, 师, a suffix meaning 'a profession of' or a skilled or 'qualified practitioner of certain professions'

So, as a consequence, a stripped and therefore 'shortcoming' translation of the Chinese word for actuary would be: 'a skilled and qualified calculator'

Sources: Masteringmandarin, Translation, Wei Liu Dictionary,
Actuary Translated: A statistician who computes insurance risks and premiums.

2. Computer
The pictogram on the right means "computer" in Chinese. Actually, it consists of two characters that literally mean "Electric Brain", which the Chinese read as "computer".

However, as you may notice, the two main characters each exist of several sub-characters that also contribute and add meaning to the word 'Computer'.

Source, and more info at: Ebrain


3. Crisis
With the current credit crisis ( 信贷危机 xìndài wēijī) in mind, let's look at the Chinese word for 'crisis'. It consists of two characters




So in Chinese crisis means something like

Crisis = Danger + Opportunity

Let's apply this to daily business life.

No matter how great the danger in a crisis is, it also means a change of circumstances that creates space for new opportunities. It's an art to spot those opportunities when you're in the middle of a crisis.

But what if you're caught in a storm crisis:

Golden Rules Crisis Risk Management
In terms of risk management: If you're caught in the storm (trouble) and can't get out, don't try to. Try to get to the eye of the storm, where it's calm.

So when you're in the middle of a (credit) crisis :

• Don't run
• Set time still (Let time do the work)
• Keep your head together
• Wait for the opportunity, no matter how hard it is or how long it takes
  

Some more tips on how to behave in crisis situations you'll find on



APPROACHING A CONFLICT SITUATION

Credit Default Swaps explained

Untangling credit default swaps from Marketplace on Vimeo.

SOURCE

DNB report on Credit Crisis

As experienced actuaries you'll probably know that 'De Nederlandsche Bank' (DNB) is the Dutch supervisor on banks, pension funds, insurers and mutual funds.

Recently DNB reported about the effects of the credit crisis.

You may find the report in the recently published:

Statistical Bulletin March 2009

Main articles in this interesting bulletin discuss the following topics:

• Capital market financing more difficult and more expensive in 2008
• Dutch banks scaled down foreign activities
• Dutch pension funds fail in realizing indexation ambitions in 2009

The bulletin also includes a description of the fully revised statistics of investment funds.

Indexation
The Dutch save massively for their pensions. To supplement their future state old age pension, nearly 6 million employees save for a pension at a pension fund. At end-2007, over 2.5 million persons received a pension benefit.

These savings have accumulated into a collective nest egg of around EUR 575 billion, i.e. nearly EUR 80,000 per Dutch household (end-2008).

For many households, pension savings are by far their largest financial asset. As a result of the credit crisis, pension funds saw their financial position deteriorate. In 2008, the pension funds’ average nominal funding ratio dropped from 144% to 95%

Chart: Funding ratio.
Broken down by interest rate effect and return on equities

According to a survey among the largest 25 pension funds, the pension sector, too, is being impacted by the credit crisis.

Following catch-up indexation last year, pension benefits will probably be indexed on average at a mere 0.2% this year. This means a loss of purchasing power for pensioners, even though the price level has fallen since the summer of 2008. Many pension entitlements accrued by employees, too, are not being indexed.

In 2009, pension contributions will rise, especially those of employers with an independent company pension fund. Employees, too, will be paying higher contributions.

Interested? More info at DNB

SOURCE

Hoax Investment Management

You and I always wanted to believe that in banking or investing business, with an overdue of compliance and regulations, we could trust on management, based on highly ethical standards.

Geraint Anderson – a successful star analyst -makes an end to that believe.

Anderson was so outraged by the greed and lust of the Square Mile that he resigned from his immoral job.

After his resign he published a book - Cityboy - about the excesses and wrongdoings within London’s financial market.

Anderson truly believes the credit crunch is a direct result of short-term gambling and the bonus culture.

Investment Technique Examples

Now, as interested actuaries, let's dive a little deeper.

To 'level up your actuarial skills' and to 'open up your eyes', just two simple examples Geraint Anderson gives of the sick making list of secret modern investment techniques:

• Pump & Dump
  Manipulation of shares is chiefly done by small teams of hedge fund operators spreading false rumours. Day in, day out, you see the shares rise slightly. Rumours go round that a certain company will be taken over. These nasty little toerags work in little groups, on mobiles, and it’s very difficult to prove who started the rumour. The shares would go up by 30%. Then they would sell.
  
  
• Trash & Cash
  The opposite of Pump & dump – Trash & Cash – also happened quite a bit. You would spread false rumours that shares were going down. At which point the hedgies would “short” the shares, namely borrow them from, say, a pension fund, sell them, watch the rumour do its work and then buy them back.

The reason why these techniques are so nasty is that they lead to financial instability, according to Anderson.

Hoax marketing
The most frightening aspect is however that no matter how strong the design of a regulation or supervisory system, it can not prohibit the negative effects of the above mentioned hoax marketing techniques.

As our investment models become more and more sophisticated, it looks like 'informal market information' is the only option to get an outperformance and 'make the difference'. At least in case of a a 'short performer'.

Solution
The solution to this problem is therefore very simple:

Set out a long term investing strategy, so you don't have to worry about (short term) volatility and never ever act on rumours or incidental high risk opportunities in the marketplace.

As actuaries - for decades - we proved that we could manage the right side of the balance sheet long term. Now let's apply that same kind of advise and strategy on the left side of the balance sheet. Success!

SOURCE